

# **Peace and Security**

## **for All**

### **A feminist critique of the current peace and security policy**

#### **Discussion Paper**

Prepared by the Feminist Institute of the Heinrich Böll Foundation

Based on the expert input of the Working Group “Gender in Peace and Security Policy and Civil Conflict Prevention”

May 2006

Peace and Security for All – A Feminist Critique of the Current Peace and Security Policy. Discussion Paper by the Feminist Institute of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, based on the expert input of the Working Group “Gender in Peace and Security Policy and Civil Conflict Prevention” and the resulting debate at the international conference “Femme Globale” in September 2005.

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The **Feminist Institute** (FI) relies on the mediation and exchange of feminist experiences and knowledge and on the practical policies pursued by the relevant institutions and organizations. Peace and security policy and civil conflict prevention from a feminist perspective are currently its main focus.

The **Working Group “Gender in Peace and Security Policy and Civil Conflict Prevention”** has existed as an honorary body of the FI since the beginning of 2004 and works as an interdisciplinary team on the topic of peace and security policy and civil conflict prevention from a feminist perspective. This discussion paper is based on its findings and expertise.

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## **Foreword**

### **Peace, Security, and Gender Relations – Feminist Perspectives on Security Policy**

**by Barbara Unmuessig**

With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of international terrorism, and growing global inequality, the strategies of international security policy have undergone fundamental changes. Conflicts and wars between states have not disappeared. Yet the vast majority of all violent conflicts are carried out within states, even though international interests and economic interdependencies play a major role. Privatized violence, global terrorist networks, international drug rings, and international trafficking in arms and people have long posed entirely new challenges and demands to international peace processes and security policy.

Every major superpower and international security institution has reformulated its security doctrine in recent years. The USA and the European Union have sharpened their foreign and security policy in corresponding strategy papers to address these new security threats. Reorientation and restructuring processes are fully underway in national and international military organizations such as the German Armed Forces (*Bundeswehr*) and NATO. Policy discussions focus on the character of “new” wars, new security needs, and the United Nations reform process.

In recent years, women’s and feminist networks have again devoted greater attention to foreign and security policy strategies. Resuming the discourse of the 1980s and early 1990s on peace and security, women’s organizations are again calling for representation in policy decisions on war and peace loudly and clearly. In crisis and conflict regions, women are raising their voices and demanding their rights of co-determination in conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, and conflict management after the end of armed conflicts.

In doing so, they are referring to the human rights codified in international agreements and in UN Resolution 1325, a recent “achievement” in international law passed by the UN Security Council in the year 2000. This resolution is a milestone on the road to more gender-sensitive peace processes and security policies. It represents the first time in the history of the United Nations that the UN Security Council passed a binding international directive to include women in decisions on war and peace.

Feminist networks are emphatically urging their governments to implement Resolution 1325. They are developing concrete action plans to integrate the resolution's directives into actual guidelines for conflict management. It will take some time to put the resolution into practice. Current foreign and security policy continues to overlook the gender issue, as do corresponding analyses. Moreover, existing knowledge of gender relations is also not being put to use by military institutions or security-policy actors. The human rights of women are violated when they are subordinated to security policy.

Our goal is to resolutely link conflict prevention and conflict management with gender equality. This is not a matter of including a marginalized group, but rather of compensating for the asymmetries in power that structure every society in this world. This includes addressing the questions: who defines security and how, by which means, and through which institutions should security be provided?

Awareness is changing – albeit slowly – that the gender assignments of “women = peace” and “men = violence/war” are not viable. In many and varied new ways, women and men are engaging in violence, conflict, and war. Yet for all the overlap, gender differences remain. Studies of peace and conflict are devoting increasing attention to these dimensions. More studies than ever before are now available on gender relations and the social categories and constructions of masculinity and femininity in war and pre-war constellations. How can traditionally feminine and masculine ideologies – which can both be part of military strategy – be overcome?

The Heinrich Boell Foundation places a high priority on exploring acquired insights and new questions, expanding knowledge, transforming it into operative policies, and influencing how peace, security, and prevention are conceptualized. The Feminist Institute at the Heinrich Boell Foundation has made “Gender, Peace and Security” its primary focus over the past few years. Using conferences, panel discussions, and publications, and by co-founding and participating in the German network *Frauensicherheitsrat* (Women's Security Council), we have already succeeded in setting many intellectual and political processes in motion.

This concern with the strategies, concepts, and concrete practice of foreign and security policy as well as conflict management runs through all of our international projects. With

offices located in many conflict areas in the world, including the Middle East, Horn of Africa, Balkans, Caucasus, and Afghanistan, the Heinrich Boell Foundation is directly confronted with conflict situations. We are also involved in prevention by actively promoting democracy and by supporting agents of civil society in post-conflict contexts such as Afghanistan. Precisely the latter poses huge challenges to projects that strive for gender equality. Nor is gender-sensitive policy within the Foundation itself assured by any means. Thus the priorities of the Feminist Institute are directed not least of all at altering and expanding perspectives in the Foundation's own work as well as at breaking gender stereotypes.

With the founding in 2004 of the Working Group "Gender in Security Policy and Civil Conflict Prevention" (*AG Gender in der Friedens-, Sicherheitspolitik und zivilen Konfliktpraevention*), whose members work on an honorary and interdisciplinary basis, the Feminist Institute has intensified its work once again. Over the past year, experts from different fields of research and practice as well as politics have examined different security doctrines, the transformation of military operations, the UN reform process, and concepts of civil conflict management from a gender perspective.

This paper presents the results of these discussions and processes at the Feminist Institute. We do not claim to cover the entire scholarly/empirical state of knowledge, let alone provide comprehensive answers. We sought to stimulate additional work on this subject at the *Femme Globale* Conference at the Humboldt University in Berlin in early September. We wanted to open our views on international and especially European peace and security policy to debate among experts and political actors from Germany and abroad, to discuss experiences and strategies, to identify deficits in knowledge and action, and to discuss further activities. The results of these activities were used to rework this paper.

This paper could not have been prepared without the unremunerated efforts of the Working Group and the expert input of its members. Many thanks are therefore due to the members of the Group: Dr. Christine Eifler (University of Bremen), Dr. Cilja Harders (Ruhr University Bochum), Jutta Kuehl (Humboldt University Berlin), Dr. Ilse Lenz (Ruhr University Bochum), Daphné Lucas (Berlin), Dr. Regine Mehl (PRIUB/Peace Research Information Unit Bonn), Ute Scheub (journalist and writer, Berlin), Dr. Cornelia Ulbert (Institute for Development and Peace, University Duisburg-Essen), Barbara Unger (consultant, Berlin), and their coordinator

Johanna Bussemer (Ruhr University Bochum), as well as to: Gitti Hentschel, Ulrike Allroggen, and former intern Magdalena Freudenschuss from the Feminist Institute.

Barbara Unmuessig  
**Executive Board / Heinrich Boell Foundation**

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## **Introduction**

### **“Peace and Security for All”**

Violent conflicts and wars have many and complex causes. Yet cause analyses generally overlook a significant factor: the gender dynamic. A look at the power relations between women and men, however, can be the key to early detection and analysis of the emergence and trajectory of crises and wars as well as to effective strategies for their resolution.

Since the mid-1980s feminist research and politics have pointed to the close connection between gender relations and war. With this paper we would like to take up their analyses and embed them in the context of current concepts of security, foreign, and peace policy. In the process, we look at the central areas and issues of the current official security policy and their manifestation at the national, European, and international level; we assess the development of concepts of security based on human rights and analyze the relationship between civil and military conflict management in foreign and security policy. We focus on the different ways specific interests define “security” in society and politics, in peace and gender studies, and in security and military strategic planning. We also analyze the various concepts of security as well as currently used notions from the standpoint of whether and to what extent they incorporate the gender perspective. In addition, we portray the different approaches for including women and for demanding gender equality, and evaluate them from a feminist perspective, not least of all in order to come a little closer to our postulated goal of “Peace and Security for All.”

“Peace and Security for All” is our vision. For some this goal may seem unrealistic and out of touch with reality. All the same, we insist on this normative demand. “Security for All” – for us this is both a demand and the starting point for our deliberations.

We have all agreed that our goal with this paper is to contribute toward integrating the gender perspective into a peace-oriented security policy, and to draw more women into the debates on security policy.

We do not claim to present a comprehensive feminist analysis on current German and international peace and security policy or to have developed far-reaching strategies for conflict management from a feminist perspective. This was beyond our scope. For one, the

one-and-a-half-year period designated for this project, which was taken on by an honorary body – the Working Group “Gender in Peace and Security Policy – was too short; second, too many deficits in knowledge still exist in these areas; and third, the working approaches and perspectives of the experts participating in the working group are too different.

The aim of this paper is to stimulate more thinking and map out a few coordinates for international discussions on peace and gender policy. We would also like to identify existing gaps in scholarship and research and thus encourage others to pursue more extensive studies in these areas.

This paper is the expression of an intense working process within a heterogeneous group. The different approaches opened up space for productive discussions, which in turn led us to question our own positions and to clear up mutual reservations. We share the goal of striving for gender-equitable and self-determined lives in nonviolent and nonoppressive contexts. Yet we differ in our views of the means and paths to achieve this goal. Thus the realization grew that an ethically-based pacifist stance must sometimes give way if certain constellations of violence call for immediate action. Nevertheless, the normative demand of peace and conflict studies commits us to the search for political strategies to overcome agencies of violence and to develop constructive, preventive strategies to deal with violent conflict.

Owing to the heterogeneous composition of our group, this paper has many contradictions and incongruities. We therefore call on others to take up and further develop these topics. At the same time, this paper is the outcome of our discussion culture, which has enriched every participant. During the discussion phase we conducted workshops and panel discussions. A first version of our paper was presented for debate at the international conference of the Heinrich Böll Foundation “Femme Globale” in September 2005. We specifically asked experts from other regions of the world to comment on the paper and invited them to participate in our debate. Some of their criticisms has been used to rework the paper; otherwise their comments are documented in notes in the appendix. We would especially like to thank Dr. Claudia von Braunmuehl, Gigi Francisco, Richa Singh, Asha Hagi Elmi, and Zamaret Hershco for their invaluable comments and insights.

A criticism often voiced in this debate, namely that this paper is Eurocentric, is justified. We are painfully aware that the paper, despite our consideration of these criticisms, still presents

a Eurocentric perspective in many respects and that we Europeans still work from a limited perspective. We regret that we were unable to portray in this paper with the appropriate level of sophistication the way current international conflicts have emerged from the background of colonialism and neocolonialism. We were also unable to focus in depth on the strategies and perspectives of female actors in the South. However, we would be very pleased to see others correct these shortcomings.

## **1. Security and Peace in the Current Sociopolitical Context**

A series of major UN conferences in the 1990s placed gender issues and peace policy on the international agenda and strengthened civil society. The normative human rights framework for a peaceful, gender-equitable world is now in place – only it has yet to be implemented in practice. Around the world, a movement has emerged of men and women working for gender equality, universal human rights, and conflict management.

War and peace are – at times clearly, but often indirectly – linked with existing gender relations. In the 2002 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security, Kofi Annan stated that “women do not enjoy equal status with men in any society.”<sup>1</sup> Women are grossly underrepresented in decision-making processes on war and peace. More complex is the question about the causes of this unequal participation. The answer requires a theoretical perspective that critically examines concepts such as security: Are nation-states truly the main guarantors of security? What kind of security is meant, and for whom? What is the connection between gender equality and peace? These questions are too seldom raised, despite the fact that gender analyses are key in developing effective strategies for conflict resolution.

The following paper will discuss in greater detail a few central aspects of these problems. This discussion will be based on an expanded notion of security as human security.

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<sup>1</sup> UN Security Council (2002): Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security. S/2002/1154, p.1. at: [[www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/sgreport.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/sgreport.pdf)] (last viewed: 12 August 2005)

## **Gender as a Political and Analytical Category**

In the German language, the English term “gender” has commonly come to refer to a person’s “social gender” as opposed to their “biological gender,” or sex. In German, the term *Geschlechterverhältnisse* (“gender relations”), is often used interchangeably with “gender.”

Social gender roles are socially constructed, affected by culture and history, and thus changeable. Gender describes social relations between and among men and women. Gender roles are revealed in a wide variety of life experiences, particularly those affected by origins, beliefs, age, sexual orientation, disabilities, and social class.

Gender becomes visible in five key dimensions:

1. **Circumstances:** The different realities in life experienced by men and women are the result of different socialization, living conditions, and spheres of activity, which lead to different positions in society. For example, it is predominantly women who experience sexual violence or take care of family members.
2. **Participation:** Women and men’s representation varies greatly in different spheres of society. For example, there are much fewer women in key military, economic, and political decision-making positions. Men, in contrast, are less likely to enter service and nursing professions.
3. **Resources:** Access to societal, material, and non-material resources is contingent upon gender roles. For example, women who work often have to take care of children and the household as well, and therefore have much less disposable time, income, and mobility. In many regions their access to education is hampered or even denied.
4. **Norms and values:** Gender roles are ascribed and established by societal norms and values. In the interaction between ascribed and (self)-constructed gender roles, identities of masculinity and femininity are constructed. For example, men are responsible for earning the family income, women for reproductive duties. Men are considered militant, and women peace-loving.
5. **Rights:** In many regions of the world, men and women – despite the universal declaration of human rights – have different rights. Even if equal rights exist on paper, they are usually not implemented in practice. For example, compulsory military service in most countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, applies to men only; in Saudi Arabia, women are denied the right to vote; in the EU, women earn 30 percent less than men for the same work, despite the proclamation of equal opportunities on paper.

### **1.1. New Wars and Conflicts in a Changing World**

With the end of the Cold War, the economic and political consequences of globalization, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the parameters for foreign, security, and development policy have changed in many different ways. These processes have had a lasting impact on the lives of people around the world. They affect the living conditions of women and men differently and are differently shaped by them. In this respect, the social group they belong to and the region they live in plays a major role. The dividing lines and commonalities are multiple and conflicting and run between North and South, rich and poor, and are based on religion and ethnicity as well as class and education. The living conditions for the vast majority in Western Europe differ radically from those in most African countries, even though, there as here, there are winners as well as losers. Poverty and social inequality are on the rise despite the increase in economic growth and production on a global scale.

The degree of misery and impoverishment is far more dramatic in countries in the South and East than in the West and North. According to the World Bank, 20 percent of the world population (ca. 1.2 billion people) live in absolute poverty and another 2.8 billion people survive on less than 2 US dollars a day.<sup>23</sup> On one hand, the absolute number of the impoverished as well as the perceptible rise in social polarization on a global scale is a normative challenge for human rights. On the other hand, peace and security issues increasingly focus on global poverty in the context of political stability. How much inequality can the world “tolerate”? When and under what conditions will it turn into instability and violence? These questions (see UN Reform, Millenium Goals, and the new security strategies) are discussed vigorously. The economic and political dispute over solutions and strategies for overcoming global poverty is currently taking place, even if international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank still unilaterally view economic liberalization as the best solution for promoting more growth and overcoming poverty.

Unfortunately the end of the Cold War did not bring about the anticipated peace dividends. The world has not become more peaceful. Alone in 2004 forty-two violent conflicts and wars were pursued around the world. The vast majority of them, however, are no longer wars between countries, but violent conflicts within them.

The failure and collapse of states became a central issue in security, peace, and development policy with the violent conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and Congo at the end of the 1990s, which cost the lives of millions. In these fragile states the state’s monopoly on power has broken down, and new, competing, often cross-border power groups with political and economic interests are forming to fill the vacuum. Some are rebelling against autocratic rulers who are no longer able to provide the population with basic services. Others are international crime organizations that traffick in arms, natural resources, drugs, and people. The protagonists spearheading the conflict on both sides are generally male.

#### **Markets of violence and new actors of violence**

Markets of violence result from the weakening of the state and the privatization of wars. Regional and local warlords, private military and security companies are becoming influential actors. Non-state constellations of

<sup>2</sup> For a critique of the World Bank’s concept of poverty see:

[[http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informeImpreso/pdfs/povertyglobalization2005\\_eng.pdf](http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informeImpreso/pdfs/povertyglobalization2005_eng.pdf)] (last viewed: 26 May 2006)

<sup>3</sup> Messner, Dirk/Scholz, Imme (Ed.) (2005): *Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik*, Baden-Baden, p. 21

violence and globally networked war economies emerge as a result. Western-oriented states, international organizations, and multinational corporations are often involved in these developments.

Reasons for the success of private actors of violence include the state's inability to guarantee security, technological advances in warfare, and the opening of markets for arms and military personnel following the Cold War.

Private actors of violence finance their wars by such means as human trafficking, prostitution, slavery, kidnapping, and blackmail; war taxes, protection money, looting, robbery; demands for natural resources such as oil, gold, diamonds, copper; legal and illegal agricultural commodities such as drugs, coffee, tropical timber, humanitarian aid (food aid), and financial aid by foreign governments or transfer payments from private persons living abroad.

Many "new wars" employ child soldiers. Approximately 300,000 children and young adults are deployed in more than 30 war zones across the world. Girls are also increasingly recruited.

Source: Sven Chojnaki (2004): Gewaltakteure und Gewaltmärkte, in: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg: Die neuen Kriege. pp.197-205.

The reasons behind these violent conflicts are varied and differ on a regional basis. They derive not only from failed or failing states or from corruption on part of the ruling elite, but also from religious and ethnic conflicts, secession movements, new political orders, poverty and misery, as well as competition for natural resources. Political, geostrategic, and economic interests also play a significant role, as does intervention from countries in the North. For example, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were products of the targeted financing of Bin Laden and his followers by the United States during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The colonial legacy of the nineteenth century and the arbitrary partitioning of African states also plays a role. Different factors collide in each conflict, triggering these violent processes. Cause analyses, however, regularly overlook one crucial factor, namely the gender dynamic. Much research still needs to be conducted on these dynamics as well as on the different ways in which men and women participate in them.

### **Victims of War and Armed Conflicts**

Wars today kill fewer soldiers than civilians. Between 80 and 84 percent of of war victims are civilians. (Source: [www.oxfam.de](http://www.oxfam.de) ). The Iraq war is one example: According to an analysis by the British medical journal *The Lancet*, since it began in March 2003, approximately 100,000 Iraqis were killed in combat, by force of arms, or through indirect results of the war within a period of 15 months. For the month of April 2006 the BBC cited the figure of 1090 civilian casualties. Among US troops, there have been just under 2,000 casualties.

Men are mainly combatants, and women suffer primarily as civilians during wars. Many results of war, such as hidden landmines, are still apparent decades later. Because women are often responsible for fieldwork and fetching water, they are more frequently wounded by landmines. Other long-term consequences of war include environmental destruction and traumatization. Here also women are more strongly affected by sexual violence in wars and conflicts than are men. Rape and forced prostitution take place in every armed conflict; they are often targeted strategies of warfare.

Source: AKUF (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung), University of Hamburg.  
Wikipedia [<http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irak-Krieg>] (last viewed: 26 May 2006)

Like international terrorism, violent conflicts often extend beyond regional borders. For Western-oriented states, the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA, as well as those of March 2004 in Madrid, and of July 2005 in London ended the presumption of inviolability they had felt within their own countries and triggered a sense of insecurity and threat. The repercussions have been far-reaching. Large segments of the population are accepting new forms of intervention politics and are willing to put up with restrictions in human and civil rights. Ethnic, religious, and cultural differences are becoming radicalized and in many ways are being exploited to promote political interests. Religious and political fundamentalism is spreading in different regions of the world, as is racism and policies of exclusion in the countries of the West, often with grave consequences for women's rights.<sup>4</sup>

## **1.2. Changes in Peace and Security Policy Discourses**

### **Human Instead of Military Security**

In light of new developments in security, peace, and development policy, peace scholars, civil society groups, political parties, and a few supranational organizations have started to reappraise perceptions of security and development. Against this background peace scholars, civil society groups, and political parties are again calling into question the existence of military alliances such as NATO and national armed forces, which they have critically challenged for decades. They have developed new concepts for civil conflict management and crisis prevention while pushing forward the debate on the concept of security. They question the "narrow" concept of security that focuses solely on the state, and strive to promote a "holistic" perspective long called for by feminist peace scholars. The feminist perspective looks at the varied causes of conflict and pays particular attention to the different interests and needs of women and men.

The UN has taken up these approaches in its debate on "human security." The concept of human security replaces the idea of state security with that of security for every individual person. As first published by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in its 1994 *Human Development Report*, people should be able to live in "freedom from fear" and in "freedom from want." This approach lists poverty, economic injustice, and disease as threats to security. In contrast to the traditional notion of security, which focuses on the state's use of force to counter potential threats, the concept of human security highlights a series of

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<sup>4</sup> See also Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Ed.) (2006): böll Thema. In Gottes Namen? Frauen und Fundamentalismus. Berlin. You can find this issue online at [www.boell.de].

strategies for civil conflict management in which the actors are not only states but also international organizations, civil society groups, private economic organizations and individuals. The goal is not to protect, but to *empower* and strengthen those affected.

Security is a construct that has developed since the late Middle Ages as an integral part of the relationship between the state and the individual. The concept of security and the policies that derive from it have changed in the context of globalization and the growing significance of international and multinational organizations. The following table shows current concepts of security and contrasts them in their various dimensions.

	<b>Classical concept of security</b>	<b>Expanded concept of security</b>	<b>Human Security</b>
<b>Understanding of security</b>	National security focuses on protecting the state’s own territorial integrity	Continued focus on national security, but broader understanding of potential security threats	Complements state/national security, focuses on the “human aspects” of security, rights, and development
<b>Referent object</b>	State	State	Individual
<b>Type of threat</b>	(interstate) military threat	Emergence of new threats, for example in environment, economy, from interstate conflicts, terrorism	Interstate and intrastate conflicts, migration, post-conflict situations, poverty, health threats
<b>Source of threat</b>	Security dilemma	Old and new conflicts breaking out as a result of dissolving old bipolar structures; cross-border problems	Globalization increasing interdependencies, political and economic inequalities, and instabilities
<b>Means of countering threat</b>	State use of force (especially military force)	State use of force must adapt to changing threats; increase state’s capacity to act by strengthening international cooperation	Countermeasures enacted on all levels by different actors (states, international organizations, private economic actors, civil social actors), protection and <i>empowerment</i> of those affected

Source: Ulbert, Cornelia: Human Security als Teil einer geschlechtersensiblen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik? In: Sicherheit und Frieden (2005), Nr. 1, Jhg. 23, p. 23.

**Human Security**

The idea of human security developed in the context of the UN in the mid-1990s. In the beginning this concept largely focused on the problem of advancing opportunities for human development. But the focus soon shifted to an understanding of security based on universal human rights. The classic definition of human security is related to two aspects of freedom, namely “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” In contrast to the narrow traditional as well as the expanded concept of security, which emphasize state actions, the concept of human security sees the individual as the key actor. It highlights the the more neglected aspects of human development and human rights in foreign and security policy debates, giving these issues new visibility. The main criticism of this concept is that it securitizes issues that should be discussed and dealt with politically in a development or legal context. Critics also point out the risk that the focus on human security may expand the use of military force to solve problems in accordance with the logic of the security context, which may then eclipse other strategies. For example, Claudia von Braunmühl criticizes that “it makes a significant difference whether a security policy is based on human rights considerations or whether a human rights policy is embedded in a security discourse.” Security as regards food, social justice including gender justice, and other

areas are human rights and should not be seen as security needs. From the perspective of human rights poverty is not primarily a security risk but above all a violation of basic human rights.

From a feminist perspective the concept of human security is especially important in view of the need to guarantee human security for women in war and crisis regions. In particular, this entails personal security, protection from sexual violence, protection from displacement, freedom of mobility, adequate food/water supplies, health/hygiene, access to education and information, legal assistance, and freedom to pursue cultural and religious practices.

Sources: Ulbert, Cornelia: Human Security – ein brauchbares Konzept für eine geschlechtergerechte aussen- und sicherheitspolitische Strategie? in: Feministisches Institut (2004): Human Security = Women's Security. pp. 155-162.

Claudia von Braunmühl, Human Security versus Human Development, in: Feministisches Institut (2004): Human Security = Women's Security, pp. 52-61.

Ulbert, Cornelia: Human Security als Teil einer geschlechtersensiblen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik? In: Sicherheit und Frieden (2005), Nr. 1, Jhg. 23, pp.20-25

[www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)

The concept of human security approximates that proposed by feminist peace scholars. For instance, both are oriented on an understanding of power that focuses more on the idea of “having the power to do something” rather than “having power over someone.” Yet it takes little account of feminists' insistence that “security” should not come to a halt for women and girls at the door to their own homes. In this context the concept hardly addresses the relations between sexualized military violence and domestic violence. Moreover, it lacks the logical connection to human and women's rights. Since it implies that the free development of the individual is an inalienable right, this right ought to represent the basis and frame of reference for this concept.

The human rights approach, pursued by some development NGOs and UN organizations, calls for national and international actions to be oriented on human rights. A state has three duties: to protect its citizens from having their rights infringed upon by third parties (*to protect*), to respect individual rights as the right of citizens to defend themselves (*to respect*), and to provide a minimum of the basic necessities of life so that its citizens can positively exercise their rights (*to fulfill*). If the state cannot or is not willing to perform these duties, the international community is called upon to intervene – within the scope of the “responsibility to protect” or through humanitarian actions. Where human rights violations occur diplomatic pressure should be applied as quickly as possible. If this does not happen and the repression of women is cited merely to justify military intervention, the acting state exposes itself to the suspicion that it is instrumentalizing the demand for human rights.<sup>5</sup>

In this respect the concept of “human security” operates with an expanded, albeit not comprehensive, concept of security. The concept of human security, however, differs from

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. section 3.1. Strengthen the UN and Promote Engendering

the “new” or “expanded concept of security” developed by Western security strategists and military experts. Although this concept of security now includes poverty and disease among the new potential threats to the state in addition to international terror, failed states, and organized crime, it grants them only a subordinate position. Unlike the concept of human security, the expanded concept of security is fixated on the state, which sees the military in particular as the central actor. This new notion of security has granted new legitimacy to NATO, which lost its function at the end of the Cold War. It has found practical application in NATO and is reflected in the defense policy guidelines of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the European Security Strategy. It is also associated with an expanded range of responsibilities for the military, which has blurred the boundaries between the civil and military sectors. Thus the *Bundeswehr* sets up schools in Afghanistan on the one hand, while engaging in anti-terrorism operations on the other.

The United Nations, international law, and the formulation of human rights have not been affected by these developments. In its aims, operations, and composition, the United Nations reflects a response to the situation following the Second World War. Reforms are urgently needed that can enable it to tackle the global challenges of the twenty-first century, especially from a gender perspective.<sup>6</sup> In the decade of the great conferences of Vienna (human rights) and Beijing (international women’s politics), it was precisely the UN that generated worldwide awareness regarding the importance of women’s and human rights.

### **Beijing Platform for Action**

In 1995, the UN Fourth World Conference on Women took place in Beijing. In addition to the 17,000 official participants, 35,000 women from all over the world met at the same time in the forum for nongovernmental organizations. The “Platform for Action” adopted by consensus at the conference formulates demands to achieve equal participation of women in all spheres of society. Two chapters of the document are devoted to the topics “Women and Armed Conflicts” and “Violence against Women.” The World Conference on Women was a brilliant finale to a discussion process that had been pursued for many years, accompanied by the hope that it would usher in a new era in international women’s politics. Concrete implementation of the Beijing Platform, however, has been slow. A follow-up session by the UN Commission on Status of Women 2005 concluded that few states have observed the guidelines for action.

For more information see: [www.glow-boell.de](http://www.glow-boell.de) / english version / main issues / Beijing +10

Local civil society organizations in both the North and South have been a major driving force behind the campaigns for gender equality, a sustainable economy, and a peaceful world. UN Resolution 1325, passed by the Security Council in 2000 thanks to decades of lobbying efforts by the women’s movement, is central to a peace-oriented approach to security policy.

<sup>6</sup> For a more in-depth discussion, see section 3.1. Strengthen the UN and Promote Engendering

It states that “an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls ... can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.”

### **UN Resolution 1325**

On October 31, 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security.” This resolution is a binding directive that women be adequately represented on all levels in peacebuilding processes, UN missions, and reconstruction work. UN member states are called on to respect the different needs of women and men in war and postwar situations, in civil crisis prevention, and during postwar reconstruction efforts. Women and girls are to be protected from sexualized violence. The content of the resolution can be summarized in three “P’s”: Participation, Prevention, and Protection.

Resolution 1325 is considered a historical achievement in light of the demands made by the international women’s movement for peace. The resolution’s weakness, however, is that it does not contain quotas, deadlines, or any way to monitor its implementation.

Source: Women’s Security Council (Germany) [www.un1325.de](http://www.un1325.de)

Resolution 1325, like the Beijing Platform of Action, has yet to be implemented in UN member states and in the UN system itself. Implementation will only truly be achieved when states and alliances use it as a guide for their military and civil activities. Here both the Federal Republic of Germany and the EU in general lack the political will, expertise, and necessary resources to do so.

### **1.3. Gender Relations, Gender Stereotypes, Gender Practices, Violence and War**

Throughout history and in many cultures gender roles during wartime show a stereotypical division: men fight with weapons and women do not – with few exceptions.<sup>7</sup> Aggression, violence, and bravery are ascribed to men, whereas women are assumed to be passive, peace-loving, and nurturing. Two leitmotifs dominate each side: the “warrior” and “statemen” for men, and the “beautiful soul” and “Spartan mother” for women.<sup>8</sup> Soldiers and politicians are contrasted with women, who are ascribed the opposing roles of ‘natural comforter’ or ‘maternal patriot.’ Images such as these promote the perception that men are naturally warlike and women are naturally peace-loving. And this perception is heightened all the more in extremely nationalist and militarist contexts. Cynthia Cockburn and Meliha Hubic note that “the nationalist discourse aims at generating a dominating, hyperactive and combative

<sup>7</sup> Goldstein, Joshua S. (2002): *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*. Cambridge and New York.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Elshtain, Jean Bethke: *Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, Just Wars and Feminism in a Nuclear Age*, in: *Political Theory* 13 (Feb 1985): 39-57.

masculinity, and a domesticated, passive and vulnerable femininity.”<sup>9</sup> It makes women into a vulnerable symbol of national identity in need of protection. It is precisely the apparent polarity of these two roles that makes them the primary elements for constructing militarized gender personae; they belong together, they complement each other, and thus form the basis for a societal legitimization of violence.

### **Terrorism and the “War on Terror”**

Recent terrorist attacks and reactions in the Western-oriented world reveal the close connection between the logic of war and gender stereotypes. The attacks on September 11th attest to an extreme disrespect for humankind, which can be interpreted as modern barbarism and an expression of militarized masculinity. At the same time, the attacks were the result of precise strategic planning and technical know-how. Their clear goal was to symbolically emasculate the “enemy” hegemonial power, the United States, and reveal its vulnerability. In the Western-oriented world, the shock and insecurity were so great that, despite expressions of criticism and opposition, the majority accepted the military invasion of Afghanistan that followed.

International terror cannot be placed in the same category as a war against terror that is legitimated by society. Still, the similarity between the masculine hegemonic features of the “war on terror” proclaimed by President Bush and those of the terrorist attacks is unmistakable (cf. insert on hegemonic masculinity on the following page). The purpose is to defeat, and even eliminate, the enemy by means of superior military force. Each side is misusing religious ideas. Enlisting transcendental values for military interests implies that the war has religious motivations and God’s approval.

The strong support for the offensive military strategy employed by the United States demonstrates how quickly societal insecurity can lead to military mobilization. It is an expression of the attempt to reestablish the state’s position of power, which was shaken by the attacks, by resorting to gender stereotypes.

Source: Kimmel, Michael S. (2003): Globalization and its Mal(e)contents. The Gendered Moral and Political Economy of Terrorism. *International Sociology*. September, Vol 18 (3), pp. 603-620.

In many societies such stereotypes closely associate masculinity with combativeness. Wars and crises do much to fuel such aggressive notions of masculinity; in fact, they constitute a fundamental aspect of “hegemonic masculinity,” even if many men reject its ideas and practice.<sup>10</sup> Hegemonic masculinity is defined by ideas specific to each culture and period, and thus varies over time and across cultures. Typical of hegemonic masculinity is the exclusion and subordination of women as well as the possession of arms and the exercise of violence to safeguard male dominance.

### **Hegemonic Masculinity**

The Australian sociologist Robert Connell describes four main patterns men follow in dealing with one another: hegemony, subordination, complicity, and marginalization. A good example of the latter are gay men who often

<sup>9</sup> Cockburn, Cynthia/Hubic, Meliha (2002): Gender und Friedenstruppen: Die Perspektive bosnischer Frauenorganisationen, in: Harders, Cilja; Ross, Bettina (Hrsg.): Geschlechterverhältnisse in Krieg und Frieden, Perspektiven feministischer Analyse internationaler Beziehungen. (translation)

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Connell, Robert W. (1995): Masculinities.

experience discrimination and subordination in a predominantly heterosexual society, or blacks in a “white” system, as well as proletarians in a bourgeois society. Connell’s basic idea is that all men, even those who live subordinate or complicit masculinities, profit from so-called patriarchal dividends. But the male who profits the most from the system follows the ideal of hegemonic masculinity; only he fits perfectly into this system. Hegemonic masculinity is “currently the accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy,” in that it ensures the dominance of men and the subordination of women.

Source: Connell, Robert (1995): *Masculinities*. University of California Press. p. 77

But men are not involved in violent processes everywhere and to the same degree. Some of them reject the roles expected of them and are active as conscientious objectors and deserters by fleeing forced recruitment. Similarly, women should not be viewed exclusively as victims of violent conflicts. They can be involved in cultures of violent conflict as much as men are, and consequently share responsibility for the escalation of conflicts by directly or indirectly legitimizing violence against “the enemy,” if not as soldiers and combatants, then as members of social groups, as arms manufacturers, nurses or smugglers. Some women carry out violence themselves, others reinforce and encourage men in their exercise of violence. Examples of the complicity and involvement of women in structures of violence are the genocide in Rwanda as well as the female perpetrators who participated in the crimes of the Nazi era.

### **Israeli Conscientious Objectors**

Each day at the crack of dawn, in military prison number six in northwest Israel, 20 male conscientious objectors gather in the prison yard. They are “refusniks,” conscientious objectors, who refuse military service due to the ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967. Since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, the refusniks have formed into a political movement. Approximately 2,000 Israelis refused service in the military or the reserves in the past five years for reasons of conscience. They consider the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to be illegal and do not wish to join an “occupation army.” “We have communists, anarchists, people from right-wing conservative families, Orthodox Jews, secularists,” says Peretz Kidron, co-founder of the first refusenik group, “Yesh Gvul.” The group is part of “New Profile,” a group of feminist men and women who support and propagate conscientious objection to military service. “New Profile” focuses on anti-military activities and theoretical questions surrounding militarization and feminism. Military service is compulsory for both men and women in Israel. Conscientious objection, however, is treated differently according to gender. Men are imprisoned, whereas women are only banned from military service – with social and career disadvantages.

Source: Konopitzky, Natasa (2005): *Israel: Abschied vom Gehorsam*, at: Newprofile, Movement for the Civilisation of Israeli Society, 30 April 2005: [<http://www.newprofile.org/showdata.asp?pid=835&language=ge>]

Women and men have different access to the means of violence. First of all, this is especially true of the state’s monopoly on power. Around the world there are still relatively few police women and female soldiers, even if their numbers vary from country to country and are an indicator of the position of women in each state. Second, it applies to interpersonal violence.

In 98 percent of all cases of sexualized violence worldwide, men are the perpetrators and women the victims. In the majority of cases involving violent acts among young people, the perpetrators as well as the victims are male.

In armed conflicts women frequently work as arbitrators between war parties. They often play important roles in peace alliances, maintain social networks and connections with the “enemy,” and are the first to restore contacts following a conflict. However, this is not an expression of a biologically determined predisposition toward peace, but is rather a consequence of their social roles: women bear the responsibility for children and other family members.

But women also belong to paramilitary groups and liberation movements. Even in traditional societies, which normally exclude women from military associations, women are quite often among the warring troops. These societies socially ostracize and discriminate against such women in the post-conflict period, by denying them the status of ex-combatants.

#### **Liberation movements and the battle of the sexes**

The question whether women in liberation movements are granted a higher status is not easy to answer. Practice shows that liberation struggles open up new opportunities for women. Thus the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua started to recruit more women as of 1973, and women ultimately accounted for around 30% of their guerilla force. In the Mexican “Zapatista Army of National Liberation” (EZLN) women accounted for 47 percent of all positions.

The conflict situation at least partly shifted women’s roles: from caretaker to fighter. In the Zapatista uprising women saw themselves invested as actors and actively brought their interests into the process of changing the entire society. They formulated a radical critique of patriarchy and were not willing to be satisfied with a few improvements for women. In this way, the female actors in the Zapatista uprising attempted to link the political struggle with the establishment of peacekeeping civil structures.

In contrast, the clear tendency in postwar countries to restore former gender hierarchies can be observed in Nicaragua. Women’s emancipation here was largely rolled back, and former female combatants were socially ostracized and experienced discrimination.

Sources: Guiomar Rovira (2002): *Mujeres de maíz*. Mexico.

Millán, Mágina (1996): *Las zapatistas de fin del milenio*. Hacia políticas de autorepresentación de las mujeres indígenas, at: [<http://www.ezln.org/revistachiapas/No3/ch3millan.html>] (last viewed: 26 May 2006)

#### **1.4. Peace and Security for All ...**

In the modern concept of the state, the nation-state that can defend itself from external forces and has a democratically legitimized monopoly on power is viewed as the guarantor of security and peace for all its citizens. From the feminist perspective, however, the positive balance of the nation-state in terms of security is not so clear. A look at the so-called private sphere shows that violence against women is a lasting and worldwide problem. The World

Health Organization concluded in a 1997 study that around the world between 10% and 50% of all women have at least once in their lives experienced domestic violence at the hands of an intimate partner. Security that ends for half of the population at the door to their own household or when they step out onto the street is no security. Therefore if domestic violence and other forms of sexualized violence are not perceived by states as a fundamental problem for security and democracy, then the magnitude of this privatized violence can bring strife and insecurity into the everyday lives of women, even in times of peace. By recognizing women's rights as human rights the state is also obliged to protect women from domestic violence.

Sexualized violence against women also reflects women's lower status in society in relation to men. In times of armed conflict these forms of seemingly private violence increase and become a systematic component of military strategy. Women are regarded as the symbol of the "nation's body" and as such they are raped, impregnated, and sexually mutilated as "war trophies." Such acts of sexualized violence serve to humiliate and demoralize the "enemy." Mass rape is used effectively as a weapon in many conflicts. Men are also victims of this kind of sexualized violence, but they talk about it less than women do, as male rape is still "a taboo within a taboo."

Sexualized violence is not limited to the parties engaged in the conflict. Foreign troops deployed in the course of a UN peacekeeping mission often exacerbate the problem of sexual exploitation. Thus the largely male UN peacekeeping forces are also often responsible for sexualized violence. Prostitution, trafficking in women, and HIV infection rates increase dramatically around the areas where troops are stationed.

For many women, violence does not end when the war ends. Domestic violence increases dramatically when demobilized soldiers return. Within their homes, traumatized and brutalized soldiers pass on the violence they experienced on the front. Ex-soldiers must therefore not only be demobilized, but also socially reintegrated. This includes encouraging them to find new civil roles as men.

## **2. From Security to Peace**

### **2.1. Peace and Security Policy? Shifts in Meaning and their Implications**

#### **The Relational Concept of Fear, Security, and Peace**

According to general perception, much higher priority is placed on issues of individual and public security than on the desire for peace and peaceable mutual relations. When they feel threatened, individuals and states seldom react rationally and nonviolently. Security seems to have a higher priority than peace. Consequently, national security policies do not require peacekeeping/building strategies for orientation, and even less so a convincing peace policy. Conversely, peace strategies require a concept of security, although this need not necessarily be based on military force.

A society's prevailing subjective sense of security plays an important role in the political implementation of security strategies. Both fears and (desires for) peace are historically shaped, and are strongly influenced by the media and political interests. The attacks of September 11, 2001 provide a particularly good illustration of the interaction of societal perception, media presentation, and political (re)action. This date marked a turning point for many people in the Western-oriented world in their perceived sense of security. This is also true of the discussion about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The following military interventions by the USA and other NATO countries have, in turn, served to intensify the real threats within their own countries.

### **2.2. Feminist Perspectives on Peace**

Whereas in hegemonic discourses military intervention is still regarded as an option for conflict management, feminist debates have developed comprehensive positive models for peace. They use the need for security and the experience of violence by individuals in what only seems to be their private sphere as a point of departure for their deliberations. In the words of the US-American scholar Judith Ann Tickner, "The achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination; genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations."<sup>11</sup> Tickner's understanding of security allows for the fact that violence within the framework of gender inequality creates the major factors that undermine women's security. She advocates

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<sup>11</sup> Tickner, Ann (1992): *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York, p. 128.

focusing on the human needs for community, solidarity, and interdependence. Her concept of security assumes an “interrelationship of violence at all levels of society.” It is dynamic, and strives more for the creation of justice than the creation of order. This includes gender equality, because “replacing warrior-patriots with citizen-defenders provides us with models that are more conducive to women’s equal participation in international politics.”<sup>12</sup>

Linking peace with the absence of every type of structural violence is a goal that would make it unattainable in the short term in many conflict regions. Yet it is not enough to imagine peace as a series of initially negative and subsequently positive conceptions. A negative concept of peace merely implies the absence of war; a positive concept of peace, in contrast, must be seen more broadly, that is, as individual security. Strategies to achieve both gender equality and peace must be conceptually linked from the very beginning.

Achieving peace and security for women and men, girls and boys in their varied life situations is an ambitious challenge. Practice-oriented feminist concepts of peace strive to meet this challenge. With the utopia of peace based on gender justice as formulated by Tickner in mind, they call for strengthening the norms of women’s rights and international law and focus on prevention instead of escalation. This is linked with a conceptual reorientation from a narrowly defined security policy to a peace-oriented security policy. In the process, feminists as a rule are calling military institutions and concepts into question. This has led to controversies in feminist discourse over the participation of women in the military.<sup>13</sup> Feminist concepts of peace are based on the universal integration of the gender perspective in all spheres as well as the equal participation of women and men at all levels and in all processes, but especially in the context of security and peace policies.

With these demands women activists have found wider acceptance in the West since the beginning of the 1990s than ever before. That the transnational women’s movement changed its strategy with regard to the World Conferences on Women contributed greatly to this success. The self-perception of many feminist NGOs has evolved from one of oppositional criticism and monitoring to a strategy of lobbying and exercising concrete influence at international UN conferences. Christa Wichterich, for instance, identified the convergence of topics at NGO and UN debates at the 1994 UN International Conference on Population and

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. section 2.4. Military and Gender in the Context of Conflict Management

Development in Cairo as a political novelty.<sup>14</sup> Today most feminist NGOs no longer only criticize UN policies, but also work to actively shape them.<sup>15</sup> This change in strategy, however, was not uncontested within the feminist NGOs themselves.<sup>16</sup>

Ultimately the efforts of numerous women's NGOs culminated in the adoption of the Beijing Platform of Action at the UN World Conference on Women in 1995. This platform engages institutional mechanisms to promote the equality of women, specifically calling for states to "support government-wide mainstreaming of gender-equality perspective in all policy areas."<sup>17</sup> As a result, the concept of gender mainstreaming, whose goal is to bring awareness of gender equality into the work of organizations, gained worldwide relevance. This also entails both integrating a gender perspective into all areas as well as promoting the equal participation of women and men at all levels and in all processes within organizations, peace missions, and institutions.

### **Gender Mainstreaming<sup>18</sup>**

#### **Basic principles**

The strategy of Gender Mainstreaming was anchored in the Platform of Action adopted by the UN Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing. As a result, this concept, which initially stemmed from the field of development, gained worldwide relevance in all policy areas, because the ratifying states felt obliged to monitor the introduction of gender mainstreaming and to develop a national plan for its implementation.

In addition, the Amsterdam Revision of the European Treaty in 1999 is a binding directive for the member states of the European Union to actively participate in promoting equality.<sup>19</sup>

#### **Definition:**

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Wichterich, Christa (1994): Postfeministische Kritik bei der Weltbevölkerungskonferenz in Kairo, in: Schöpfungsgeschichte: zweiter Teil. Neue Technologien, Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis, 38, Köln, pp. 145-151.

<sup>15</sup> Clark, Ann Marie/Friedman, Elisabeth J./Hochstetler, Kathryn (1998): The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women, in: World Politics 51(1), pp. 1-35, p. 15.

<sup>16</sup> For instance, the obvious hierarchies between NGOs from the North and those from the South were criticized. While the former have more opportunities to influence the conference by lobbying delegates, for the most part the latter can only participate in the NGO forum. A NGO publication on the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro succinctly describes the international hierarchies between the NGOs: "(...) the Africans were watching, the Asians listening, the Latin Americans talking with the North Americans while the North Americans and the Europeans were doing business." In: Terra Viva, June 15, 1992, in Earth Summit: The NGO Archives, cd-rom NGO-net, Montevideo 1995.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. also [[http://www.glow-boell.de/de/rubrik\\_2/5\\_124.htm](http://www.glow-boell.de/de/rubrik_2/5_124.htm)]

<sup>18</sup> The position of the Heinrich Boell Foundation on Gender Mainstreaming can be read in the thesis paper by Barbara Unmüessig "Reflections on Gender Mainstreaming – taking stock of a radical social-political concept ten years after the Beijing World Conference on Women" at: [[http://www.glow-boell.de/de/rubrik\\_2/5\\_1161.htm](http://www.glow-boell.de/de/rubrik_2/5_1161.htm)]

<sup>19</sup> Art. 2 EC: "The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community (...) equality between men and women"; Art. 3 Para. 2 EC: "In all the other activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women."

The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defined gender mainstreaming in 1997 as "... the process of assessing the implication for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and equality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality."

"To mainstream" or "mainstreaming" means making something commonplace and self-evident, that is, introducing the equality of women and men as an issue at all levels. Gender mainstreaming strives for the equal participation of women and men at all levels and in all processes within organizations. Its objective is to integrate the gender perspective into all spheres.

#### **Challenges:**

The systematic implementation of these two objectives has yet to be put into practice. In many cases problems surrounding the equal participation of women and men have become more visible. This is clearly illustrated in UN Resolution 1325, which demands the equal participation of women in peacebuilding and peacekeeping processes. A specific challenge to its implementation is not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspects of achieving equality.

#### **Sources:**

Frey, Regina (2003): *Gender im Mainstreaming – Geschlechtertheorie und –praxis im internationalen Diskurs*, Königstein/Taunus.  
Braunmühl, Claudia von; Padmanahban, Martina (2004): *Geschlechterperspektiven in der Entwicklungspolitik. Eine Einleitung*, in: *Femina Politica* 2/2004 (Jg. 13), pp. 9-14.  
Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997 (A/52/3), 18 September 1997.

## **2.3. Feminist Dilemmas**

Feminist politics faces several dilemmas in the area of security and peace. Should feminists strive to eliminate the military or strive to reform it within by promoting gender equality? Should they participate in decision-making processes on wars or exercise pacifist abstinence? Feminist perspectives on peace thus find themselves caught between external and internal critiques, between the attempt to overhaul the military/strategic system and the attempt to have it adopt concrete gender-sensitive agendas. Feminist peace research – including this paper – will probably not be able to resolve this dilemma in the foreseeable future.

Feminists disagree over the extent to which the military is capable of fundamental reform and whether it makes sense to demand equal representation for women at all levels of the military. Advocates of the latter argue that large sums of money are poured into defense budgets and that women should therefore participate in deciding how this money is used, in line with gender budgeting. Furthermore, they argue, the exercise of violence should not, as a matter of principle, be left to men alone. Opposing this view is the strictly peace-oriented feminist position, which assumes that the military is incapable of reform and should thus be eliminated. This view advocates devoting all available means and resources to conflict management processes that prevent violence. In so doing, it does not deny that conflict is a routine part of human coexistence – at the level of states, organizations, and families. The problem is not conflict itself, but the use of violence to resolve it.

This feminist peace-oriented position faces a dilemma in situations of war and menace. In their analysis of the causes of violent conflicts and their pursuit of long-term civil strategies of peacekeeping and crisis prevention, many feminist pacifists have ultimately accepted the deployment of military peacekeeping forces under a UN mandate, if such a mission may prevent a genocide for example.

However, on a pragmatic level, as long as women are not integrated into the military, these peacekeeping forces will continue to consist entirely of men. Without a critical examination of gender relations in the military, prostitution and trafficking in women will continue to accompany the deployment of such troops. This is the starting point for feminists who do not advocate a pacifist position. We will take a look at both of these schools below: the analysis of gender relations and their significance for a military context on the one hand, and a discussion of civil conflict management as a peace-oriented option for action on the other.

## 2.4. Military and Gender in the Context of Conflict Management

With the end of the Cold War and the policy of mutual deterrence between the superpowers, military organizations such as NATO have undergone a major shift in their role in global politics since the 1990s. On the one hand, their importance has declined, and consequently a new range of diverse responsibilities has developed to legitimize their existence. On the other hand, their power to define their field of activity has increased. Their responsibilities today range from military intervention with armed force, the mediation of conflicts, the monitoring of human rights, and the performing of humanitarian aid to rebuilding societies in post-conflict countries. Military forces also often perform police and civil duties in their areas of deployment. They thus affect the economic and political life in conflict regions as well as gender relations. Nowadays the states sending troops and the UN often task military forces with promoting settlement and reconciliation between formerly hostile groups. Thus the military possesses considerable symbolic significance and exerts enormous political influence in shaping postwar societies in deployment areas. This requires qualifications and expertise for which military personnel thus far have received little training. In crisis regions, the question of the role of women in society is quite often disputed terrain between political, ethnic, religious, and cultural communities, and thus part of the conflict. To reduce conflict and establish structures capable of maintaining the peace, knowledge about local social, political, and cultural conditions, which includes the dynamic of gender relations, is as essential as knowledge about the causes, history, and trajectory of the conflict. Male and female soldiers must be trained in gender awareness if they are to be in a position to support local women in obtaining equal participation in new democratic structures. Soldiers must support processes that reflect on gender relations and stereotypes in conflict societies and that incorporate the gender perspective into peacebuilding measures.

### **Gender Indicators for Conflict Prevention and Management**

In principle, all measures of civil conflict management can be examined and improved by means of gender indicators and concrete recommendations from peacekeeping and early warning/prevention systems. The following points can serve as guidelines:

- Gender-sensitive context analysis: This includes critically questioning one's own understanding of gender, as well as a gender-specific analysis of all groups involved. This objective can be attained by collecting gender-specific data and

by securing sufficient personnel and financial resources to allow for ongoing, consistent integration of a gender perspective.

- Gender-sensitive conflict analysis: This focuses the analysis on gender relations and conflict, as well as on the question of gender-specific concerns and conflict management mechanisms.
- A considered approach to the gender strategies employed by different actors.
- Women's participation in all important decision-making processes: This aspect can be used as a guideline for civil conflict management, as well as an index for its evaluation. This extends from inclusive goal-setting to equal participation in the political and societal structures in post-conflict societies, from access to and control over resources at all levels (household, community, state) to participation in all peace-promoting activities.
- Further elements that must be included in gender-sensitive evaluations include the following: selection of partner organizations, analysis of budgeting, and target groups for all activities.
- At the state level, an important indicator for gender-sensitive peace and security policy is the ratification and implementation of international agreements pertaining to women's/human rights and empowerment.

Sources:

Reimann, Cordula (2004b): KOFF Working Paper: Gender in Problem-Solving Workshops: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing. Bern.

Cfd/Christlicher Friedensdienst (Hrsg.) (2004): Focus on Gender and Peacebuilding: Gender- und konfliktsensitives Programm-Management, Nr.2/04, at: [[http://www.cfd-ch.org/newsletter\\_gender.html#Anchor-30137](http://www.cfd-ch.org/newsletter_gender.html#Anchor-30137)]

In addition to the military, many non-governmental actors are active in crisis and conflict regions. The boundaries between these two groups are becoming more blurred. On the one hand, the military is taking on more civil tasks in conflict and crisis regions, and on the other it is increasingly working together with civil organizations. States such as the Federal Republic of Germany frequently support and fund different actors at the same time, entrusting them with various tasks. This expansion of the military's fields of action is creating a new constellation. Many civil actors are critical of the military because of their own histories (as conscientious objectors, feminists, peace activists). Yet mutual acceptance is essential if they are to cooperate constructively and succeed in their joint work in civil conflict management. Dismantling reservations about the other side is thus often the first priority. In this respect both sides have made great strides in recent years.

### **Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)**

Civil military cooperation (CIMIC) has assumed an increasingly important role since the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some consideration of its merits is also taking place on a theoretical level in NATO, EU, and individual states, including the Federal Republic of Germany. As an actual program, however, it is currently only being implemented by nation-states.

CIMIC as an instrument remains contentious from both military and civil perspectives. Many see it as a positive development that CIMIC focuses on civil conflict management, which indicates its wider acceptance. Others counter that CIMIC is still an instrument of the military system. The military remains the main actor in conflict regions, normally where it has already been deployed, such as in the course of so-called humanitarian interventions. As a result, the roles of civil and military organizations become difficult for the affected population to distinguish, which can significantly slow down the process of rebuilding a country's civil structures. Furthermore, the decision-making power for CIMIC operations remains in the hands of the military. While civil actors are allowed to play a key role in conflict management itself, they cannot influence the overall situation. CIMIC thus displays an imbalance between military and civil components from the outset. Civil conflict management runs the risk of losing its pacifist and preventive orientation by means of such cooperation. In addition, it lacks a gender perspective. Previous CIMIC programs have been gender-blind with respect to both content and the participation of women.

Source: Buro, Andreas (2004): CIMIC – ein brisanter Cocktail, at: *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative* [<http://www.friedenskooperative.de>]

Studies on the impact of peacekeeping troops on civil societies give an ambivalent picture (cf. Cockburn/Zarkov/Hubic). On the one hand, non-governmental women's organizations and segments of the civil population often greatly value the military's presence for its ability to stabilize community life and develop security. One good example of this is Bosnia. Aid shipments as well as reconstruction and normalization services, which are often accompanied by civil support measures, are also very well received. The opportunities that international troops present for local economies is another factor that is viewed positively. At the same time, the gender policies of military contingents have a considerable impact on local developments, in a way that – as discussed above – remains largely unexamined. Women's organizations frequently complain, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, that they are generally excluded from democratization and reconstruction processes, and receive only limited access to educational opportunities. Instead, they are relegated to "women's activities" such as hairdressing, knitting, and sewing. Here reform is urgently needed.

On the other hand, the presence of these troops also has an extremely negative impact on the communities in which they are deployed. Studies show that prostitution, sexual violence, trafficking in women, and the incidence of HIV infections rise dramatically in these communities, which is counterproductive to efforts to reconstruct societies based on gender equality. A lack of gender expertise on the part of the military is also responsible for many other instances of mismanagement. Women and their needs are still far from sufficiently addressed in the planning and construction of refugee camps. Women and girls, who, in many cases, make up 70-80 percent of the refugees, often lack safe access to water, toilet facilities, and food. As a consequence, they are too often molested and even raped by men in unsecured washrooms and toilet facilities. According to a UN report, violence continues to rise in these supposedly safe camps, where an average of 80 percent of women and girls are subjected to sexualized violence.<sup>20</sup>

In order to counter the concrete effects of gender blindness in the military system, feminist critics call for gender-sensitive conflict analysis and resolution – within the reigning conceptual framework. Both this issue and the above-mentioned dilemma of the critical peace-oriented approach could be solved by creating a UN force that consists of mixed-gender police and military units, which intervenes on the basis of gender-sensitive conflict analysis and which possesses the necessary training to do so. Its deployment would have to be subject to clearly defined criteria and a resolution by the UN Security

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<sup>20</sup> Nordstrom, Carolyn (1998): Girls Behind the (Front) Lines, in: Lorentzen, Lois Ann / Turpin, Jennifer (eds.): *The Women and War Reader*. New York, p. 85.

Council – always under the condition that all other political means, in particular diplomacy and civil conflict prevention mechanisms, have been exhausted. This will not resolve the basic dilemma faced by pacifist feminists, but could give them a pragmatic orientation.

## Lynndie England

In the spring of 2004, Lynndie England, a private in the US army, gained notoriety when the photos of torture in Iraq's Abu Ghraib military prison were published showing her in sexually charged poses. Her example powerfully illustrates the complex and contradictory relationship between gender and violence in the 21st century.

Gender stereotypes play a key role in the legitimization of this kind of violence. Currently two contradictory trends can be seen in the United States and Europe. On one hand, the traditional cliché persists that women are peace-loving and men aggressive. On the other hand, the presence of women in military combat is increasing. The cliché of the peace-loving woman explains why the media doubly scandalized the Lynndie England case. Not only does a woman inflicting torture and apparently enjoying it defy human rights conventions, it also defies common notions of femininity.

In an environment where one is exempt from punishment and has access to violent means, both men and women are capable of carrying out violence. Women offenders are known in all cultures and ages. Prominent examples from recent German history include female concentration camp overseers and informers. According to the New York Times, Lynndie England said in a hearing, "We thought it looked funny. That's why we took pictures." To the question of whether she felt that she ever overstepped legal boundaries, she is supposed to have answered "no." According to a record of the hearings, the only part she found inappropriate was the forced masturbation of prisoners.<sup>21</sup> This makes her responsible and culpable for the crimes committed. The pornographic photos have provoked debates in the media as to whether it is particularly demeaning for an Arab man to be tortured by a woman. Heide Oestreich, a journalist for the German newspaper *taz*, rightly pointed out that such speculation only confirms the subjugation fantasies of those who ordered or committed this type of torture. Only those who believe that pink underwear is humiliating for a man would have the idea of forcing prisoners to wear pink underwear, as is common in some US prisons. Therefore, the pictures reveal more about US soldiers' violent pornographic fantasies vis-à-vis Arab prisoners than vice versa. Above and beyond this, a culturalist perspective can be dangerous, as the presumption of sensitivities undermines both the universality of human rights and the universal applicability of the Geneva Conventions.

Lynndie England's symbolic emasculation of the enemy as she smilingly pointed to the genitalia of an Iraqi prisoner with a cigarette in her mouth, is a common military topos. Feminization as a form of abuse and degradation is a part of all systems of militarized masculinity. This applies to marginalized masculinities within one's own ranks as much as to that of the supposed enemy. US author Linda Burnham writes that "the Abu Ghraib portraits of sexual humiliation and submission have exposed the unbelievably tangled strands of racism, misogyny, homophobia, national arrogance and hyper-masculinity that characterize the U.S. military. Militarized sexual domination is neither "contrary to American values" nor simply the work of a few 'bad apples.' It is, rather, a daily practice."<sup>22</sup> Herein lies something that is specific not to a culture but rather to the military. Even if military leaders punish sexual violence in order to uphold discipline, sexual hygiene, and integrity, the degradation of femininity is a primary component in systems of militarized masculinity. Allowing a woman to sexually humiliate an Arab man leaves US American masculinity intact. The Arab prisoner is rendered impotent, not the American soldier, despite the pictures' portrayal of male fear at the hands of a powerful female. Such portrayals of "reverse" rape underscore the extent to which the military system is based on degradation of the "feminine."

Sexualized violence need not necessarily emerge from this system, yet it does so time and time again. This includes, for example, the enormous red-light districts that regularly develop around US army bases throughout the world.

Source: This is a translated excerpt of the following article" by Cilja Harders, published in "Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik": Harders, Cilja (2004): Moderne Kriegermütter und die neue Weltordnung, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Nr. 9, Jg., pp. 1001-1111.

## 2.5. Prevention Instead of Escalation

A peace-oriented policy promotes forms of violence prevention in all crisis and conflict regions, and strengthens the role of local actors engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Traditional conflict management mechanisms, such as reconciliation processes based on public negotiations,

<sup>21</sup>[[www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,300167,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,300167,00.html)]

<sup>22</sup>Linda Burnham: Sexual Domination in Uniform: An American Value, see: [[www.war-times.org/issues/WT\\_gender&abughraib.html](http://www.war-times.org/issues/WT_gender&abughraib.html)]

apologies, or material compensation, play an important role here, but often explicitly or implicitly exclude women. Therefore traditional forms of preventing violence between population groups and states are not sufficient. All societal and government institutions, as well as families and schools, must be called into play here.

A major problem in prevention is the large gap between early warning and early action. All conflicts display early warning signs, such as reports by critical journalists, human rights organizations, and politicians. But often there is insufficient political will to heed the warning voices, or there are no efficient strategies for resolving conflicts. Conflicts that have not (yet) undergone violent escalation have a hard time drawing the necessary political and media attention. This is a fundamental dilemma faced by conflict prevention, since the mark of successful conflict prevention, after all, is precisely that it yields a “non-event.” Therefore the importance of existing early warning systems are often not recognized. Furthermore, there are many different early warning systems, all with different indicators. What all these systems have in common is the lack of an integrated, or systematically integrated, gender perspective. The international community could step in here to standardize existing approaches based on transparent criteria, analyze the specific situation in each region, and incorporate the gender dimension. Instead of investing in modern weapon systems, states should fund UN efforts to expand an internationally uniform, but region-specific early warning system.

### **Women and Civil Conflict Management**

The term “civil conflict management” encompasses a broad spectrum of civil actors and actions. These include the nonviolent work of grassroots groups, work with local governments, trade unions, and churches, as well as diplomatic and humanitarian efforts and attempts at crisis prevention through development cooperation or as an intervention on the part of foreign civil groups.

For a long time, the role of women in civil conflict management remained much less visible than that of men. This is due in part to the fact that women work primarily on a grassroots level – in self-help groups that address food supply, health, trauma care, and similar concerns – but do not appear to contribute directly to conflict management. This peacekeeping work by women is often viewed as exclusively humanitarian, and thus is denied political significance.

Frequently, however, it is precisely via these concerns for daily needs that women reach an understanding with each other above and beyond the lines of conflict. Women tend to provide invisible “routine peacekeeping services,”<sup>23</sup> by providing mutual support and maintaining social relations. In this way they build bridges for reconciliation, which can then have an impact on negotiations at a political level.

### **The Sixth Clan – Somali Women as Agents of Peace Policy**

<sup>23</sup> Reimann, Cordula (2004a): Roles of Women and Men in Violent Conflicts. KOFF Info Sheet (March); Bern.

Peace negotiations between hostile Somali clans in Djibouti were launched in 2000 without the participation of a single woman. In accordance with traditional clan structure, only the male representatives of the five clans were given access, as women has no voice in the political structures of Somali society. In response, Somali women created a Sixth Clan – the women’s clan spanning all others – thereby establishing their own voices as well as access to the peacebuilding process. This type of representation at the state (macro) level had sustainable effects on women’s peacebuilding efforts at the societal (meso) and individual (micro) levels. The women worked above clan divisions and as arbitrators between different militias. Through the creation of the Sixth Clan, women’s multiple contributions to the peacebuilding process achieved recognition and integration at all levels.

However, the women of the Sixth Clan were unable to make a lasting contribution to the peace process. Today Somalia is farther away than ever from achieving a peaceful future. Rival warlords, Islamists, and shady racketeers have divided the country between them. Politically active women have received threats, and some – as well as men in the opposition – have been killed. Efforts to oppose such threats and criminal machinations have had little impact. Parts of Somalia have reverted back to the control of warring clans.

Source: From a report by Asha Hagi Elmi at the Femme Globale conference in September 2005 [[http://www.glow-boell.de/de/rubrik\\_2/5\\_979.htm](http://www.glow-boell.de/de/rubrik_2/5_979.htm)]

On a national level, women’s groups attract attention through acts of civil disobedience, demonstrations, and lobbying. In doing so, they often make use of stereotypical images of mothers or “peace-loving women.” From time to time, “Women in Black” or widows’ and mothers’ groups in various parts of the world elicit international attention while other protest movements face greater reprisals. As such, gender stereotypes can be used effectively and subversively when women use traditional gender roles in their resistance work. This strategy, however, can have a boomerang effect if they are confined to these gender roles and develop no new forward-looking role models for women.

Women often work together with men to establish peace zones, as in the Philippines. They lead movements against conscription, as in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Israel, and Guatemala. They organize marches in support of disarmament or to protest violence. Countless examples demonstrate the potential that women have for conflict management: Liberian women have collected small arms; Cambodian women have worked for nonviolent elections; and Palestinian and Israeli women have developed joint political initiatives despite the many hostilities. The list of courageous women and their nonviolent actions is long. Many female peace activists come from self-help organizations and religious communities, but also from women’s rights movements. Women’s contributions to peace at the level of grassroots organizations is only a small step away from active conflict intervention, namely from declared commitment to the fight against ethnic segregation, for human rights, and for the idea of peaceful coexistence. In a structural context, women prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. Here it is important to keep in mind that women engage in peacebuilding actions not because of their gender, that is, because it is in their “nature” to do so, but because of the roles they assume or have been assigned.

### **Women for the Nobel Peace Prize**

The grassroots activity associated with the campaign “1000 Women for the Nobel Peace Prize” has recently gained increasing recognition. Candidates were chosen for their comprehensive perspectives on peace and a new notion of security based on “human security”: “The women selected are experts in promoting a life in security and dignity (...) A glance at

their activities shows that they work in the following fields: political rights, economic policy, peace promotion, health, education, the environment, and children's rights, as well as the struggle against violence, organized crime, and trafficking in human beings. They are active on all levels: local, regional, national, and international. (...) Millions of women are engaged daily in working for a better future. Without regard for their own safety, they are active on behalf of the community's well-being. They call for reconciliation, demand justice, and rebuild what has been destroyed. They transform conflicts. They fight against poverty and for human rights. They create alternative sources of income, and they strive for access to land and clean water. They educate and heal. They reintegrate HIV patients. They find solutions to a great many forms of violence and they condemn the genital mutilation of girls."

Source:[ [www.1000peacewomen.org](http://www.1000peacewomen.org)]

Women also contribute greatly to nonviolent third-party civil interventions, namely by non-governmental actors and international organizations. They enable reconciliation work, perform monitoring services, and support educational measures for peace and human rights. For example, unarmed members of "peace brigades" have accompanied human rights defenders in Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, as well as in other crisis countries. The work of these mostly female peace brigades demonstrate the power and great potential of civil interventions.

For many women, peace activism carries considerable risks while it does not ensure their participation in official peace processes. Also – or precisely – when international organizations intervene in conflicts, women and their organizations are often left out. Women's groups are seldom noticed by diplomatic personnel, and are consequently excluded from decision-making processes as well as from conflict mediation positions. The value ascribed to women's work on local levels rises in accordance with an understanding of civil conflict management and peacebuilding that aims to achieve a culture of peace. At a UN conference in New York in July 2005, the international network of non-governmental organizations known as Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) honored the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts. Different gender roles are explicitly listed in GPPAC's "Global Action Agenda." It identifies women as the main guarantors of "structural prevention."<sup>24</sup> In its "People Building Peace" program, GPPAC calls on governments, regional organizations, and the UN to devote more attention to the peacebuilding efforts of women. In so doing, it takes up the worldwide demands of women's organizations, and takes UN proclamations on women's rights literally.

Peace negotiations are extremely important, but they are only the first step in a long process of establishing peace. Without participation by the population at large, this process is nearly impossible. Only when women participate equally in the peace process is it possible to ensure that they will not be thrown back into pre-conflict roles, which are often part of the causes of the conflict.

### **3. Security and Peace in International Practice**

#### **3.1. Strengthen the UN and Promote Engendering**

In the course of the past century, many international, interstate, and intrastate conflicts required external intervention to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. The only institutions authorized by international law to intervene in a conflict are the UN and the UN Security Council. The question of when and under what circumstances and by what means an intervention should be carried out often reveals a problematic interpretation of the notion of security. The use of military

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. GPPAC/Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2005): People Building Peace. A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, at: [<http://www.gppac.net/>]

interventions to enforce human rights provoked major political disputes in the 1990s. After Iraq occupied Kuwait, the UN Security Council authorized the use of military force to protect the Kurdish civil population in Northern Iraq. Subsequent military interventions, such as in Somalia and Haiti, have been justified by arguing that instable political systems and the associated violence in these countries threaten international or regional peace. Such interventions are problematic in nature, because the concept of state sovereignty in international law stipulates non-intervention in relations between states.<sup>25</sup> The resulting focus on military sanctions also reduces public awareness of civil forms of intervention.

Military interventions can also violate the ban on violence and the non-intervention clause in the UN charter when they themselves are associated with grave violations of human rights and humanitarian crises. Thus the only military interventions sanctioned by international law are those authorized by the UN Security Council. Given the veto powers of the five permanent members of the Council, namely the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France, this authorization process always entails extended negotiations. In general, the UN sanctions military interventions only on humanitarian grounds. The reforms proposed by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, whose members were appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recommended using military intervention “as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”<sup>26</sup> The High-Level Panel formulated five criteria that the UN Security Council should consider when authorizing the use of military force (High-Level Panel on Threats 2004: 67, Para. 207). First: All diplomatic, political, and economic means for averting conflict must be exhausted (“last resort”). Second: The “seriousness of threat” must then be assessed to determine whether the use of force is appropriate. Third: The intervention must be appropriate to the degree of threat and may not be oriented to other interests (“proper purpose”). Fourth: Robust peacekeeping forces must be suitably equipped in order to actually attain the goal required of them (“proportional means”). Fifth: Military operations may not lead to worse consequences than non-intervention by the international community (“balance of consequences”). Although UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan incorporated these proposals into his report entitled “In Larger Freedom,” UN member states have yet to agree on a list of clearly defined criteria.

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<sup>25</sup> This is also reflected in the principle of “sovereign equality” among UN member states, referred to in Art. 2.1 of the UN Charter.

<sup>26</sup> High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004): *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN document A/59/565), New York, p. 66, Para. 203.

Following the 2001 report “The Responsibility to Protect”<sup>27</sup> released by the “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (ICISS), UN Secretary-General Annan, in his report to UN member states on reform, urged states to take seriously the responsibility they bear for the well-being of their populations and to take collective action as an international community against states that neglect this responsibility (Annan 2005: 35, Para. 135). Participants at the World Summit session “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit” in September 2005 (A/60/L.1) called for every state to accept “the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (A/60/L.1: Para. 138-140). They recommended the use of non-military and military means to prevent such crimes to the extent they are “appropriate and necessary.” For the use of military force they devised the following formula: “In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (A/60/L.1: Para. 139). Despite this clarification, precise criteria, as proposed in the High-Level Panel report, on which to base decisions to use military sanctions are still lacking.

The danger of instrumentalizing humanitarian justification still remains very high. Afghanistan is a good example. The fundamentalist Taliban who established the world’s most misogynist regime had initially been supported by Western countries. It was only after the attacks of September 11, 2001 that widespread media and political attention began to focus on the massive violations of human rights suffered by women. In the debate leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan, the oppression of Afghan women was used to legitimate military intervention.

Attempts to use women’s rights as a legitimizing factor for military interventions should be viewed with some ambivalence. On the one hand, human rights can only be taken seriously when they are protected worldwide; on the other hand, this protection should follow from a concept of human rights that encourages action at an early stage and with prevention in mind. As a result of international lobbying by women’s organizations, the final document of the 1993 UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna expressly emphasizes the principle that “women’s rights are human rights.”<sup>28</sup> As a consequence, genital mutilation and domestic violence, namely gender-specific violations of human rights, were placed on the international agenda. Two years later, the UN Conference on Women in

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<sup>27</sup> More information on this expert commission can be found on their Web site at [<http://www.iciss.ca>].

<sup>28</sup> Bunch, Charlotte (1990): Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, in: Human Rights Quarterly 12: 4, 486-498.

Beijing again emphasized the right of women to live without violence. In 1994, a UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences was appointed. In the course of the 1990s, sexualized violence was defined as a crime in international criminal law, starting with the respective decisions by UN tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and then as statutory offences under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Article 7 of its Rome Statute lists rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, and other comparably severe forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity.

In the past decade the United Nations has strengthened women's rights in many areas. Today plans of action exist for all major areas such as the fight against poverty, health, education, and trade.<sup>29</sup> UN Resolution 1325 was ground-breaking in the area of peace and security. In recent years, the UN Special Rapporteur (on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences) has repeatedly addressed the problem of forced prostitution and trafficking in women. Several UN commissions have investigated sexual assaults on female refugees by UN employees participating in a UN peacekeeping mission. The UN Secretary-General drew up a report for the UN General Assembly (UN document A/59/710) in March 2005, and the UN Security Council issued an unprecedented condemnation of sexual abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel at its session on May 31, 2005.

The final document of the 2005 World Summit included diverse demands by women activists in the areas of education, employment, gender justice, empowerment, and human rights. Especially noteworthy is the paragraph on "Women in the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts": "We stress the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 on women and peace and security. We also underline the importance of integrating a gender perspective and of women having the opportunity for equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, as well as the need to increase their role in decision-making at all levels. We strongly condemn all violations of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and the use of sexual exploitation, violence, and abuse, and we commit ourselves to elaborating and implementing strategies to report on, prevent and punish gender-based violence." (A/60/L.1: Para. 116).

This confirmation of earlier declarations on gender equality demonstrates the success gender mainstreaming has had on a normative level within the framework of the United Nations. Still,

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<sup>29</sup> See UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (2002): *Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview*. New York.

formulating a norm does not ensure adherence to it in practice. Additional reforms in the UN are needed from a gender perspective. For example, there are still no concrete proposals on how to integrate the gender perspective in the event of an external intervention. The absence of clearly defined criteria for civil and military interventions means that every intervention can be instrumentalized by individual state interests. Taking Afghanistan again as an example, if the “responsibility to protect” had been taken seriously on a declaratory level, the international community would have intervened long before the U.S. military intervention: namely when the terror of the Taliban against women became public at the end of the 1990s. But not even a resolution in favor of civil forms of intervention such as diplomatic or economic sanctions, as demanded by women’s groups, was passed at this time. The International Criminal Court was first established in 1999 with the Rome Statute, and therefore was not yet active. This example shows that the “right to intervene” that has now been accepted by the community of states must be enforced by civil means. One of the major weaknesses in the authorization of military interventions continues to be the UN mandates themselves. The complicated negotiation process in the UN Security Council as well as between the council and the UN Secretariat has often caused mandates to be formulated in vague terms, raising high expectations that can never be met due to a lack of funding, personnel, and logistics. Moreover, given the narrow scope of mandates, troops in affected areas can react only poorly to changing needs. Gender-specific objectives can only be implemented if they are defined in the mandates – which is currently not the case. This is just one point in which the mandate formulation process urgently needs to be reformed. In connection with this, the financial requirements associated with each mandate must be precisely specified, because they directly affect the mandate’s scope and type of implementation. And above all, it is important that all other non-military forms of intervention be exhausted before resorting to military sanctions.

Even the few gender-specific demands in the report by the High-Level Panel are not sufficient. Although the High-Level Panel and the final document of the 2005 World Summit refer explicitly to Resolution 1325, they make no recommendations as to how the resolution should be implemented. Point 4 of Resolution 1325, for example, states that the role and contribution of women should be expanded by promoting their work as military observers, civil personnel, civil police, and as human rights and humanitarian personnel for UN field missions. At present, however, only 4.4 percent of civil police forces, one percent of military personnel, and 27.5 percent of the remaining personnel in peacekeeping operations are women. Only two of the current 18 peacekeeping missions have a woman as Head of Mission (UNOMIG) in Georgia) or Special Representative (ONUB in Burundi). Delegating more UN Special Ambassadors and increasing the proportion of women in peacekeeping missions are

two simple and effective strategies to fulfill Resolution 1325. An additional crucial factor for success is the corresponding political will, at least on the part of the states that make up the mission.

Major political differences between the UN member states have thus far hindered the implementation of most of the High-Level Panel's reform proposals. One of these proposals, resolved by the UN General Assembly in its session on December 20, 2004, is to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (cf. A/Res/60/180).<sup>30</sup> This Commission will propose integrated strategies and help obtain financing for reconstruction work in post-conflict societies, as well as develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, military, and humanitarian actors. Following a lengthy debate, it was agreed that the Commission will consist of an Organizational Committee with a total of 31 member countries,<sup>31</sup> although the real work of the Commission will be in its country-specific committees.<sup>32</sup> Kofi Annan, however, rejected the idea in his reform report – in contrast to High-Level Panel proposals – that the Commission be entrusted with early warning systems as part of its conflict prevention work. More time will therefore have to pass before the concept of prevention can be anchored in an institutional framework.

Some of the reform proposals formulated in a series of papers contain points of departure for feminist demands. On the one hand, the Peacebuilding Commission could be a vehicle for implementing Resolution 1324, to the extent that the necessary resources can be made available. On the other hand, redistribution could also weaken existing UN structures that address women's concerns. This must be prevented at all costs. Indeed, especially the CSW (Commission on the Status of Women), UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), and CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) must increase their status and value within the institutional structure of the UN system. To better protect human rights, the respective responsibilities of the Human Rights Commission, or the newly created Human Rights Council, and the Security Council have to be modified. The dominant influence of the Security Council often hinders the use of preventive intervention by civil means. Regrettably, none of the draft reforms for the Security Council contains

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<sup>30</sup> For more information on the Peacebuilding Commission and its planned responsibilities, see its Web site at [<http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding>].

<sup>31</sup> Seven members of the Security Council (including permanent members), seven members from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), five members out of the top ten financial contributors to the UN budgets, five members out of the top ten providers of military personnel and civil police to UN peacekeeping missions, and seven additional members, to redress remaining geographical imbalances and include countries with post-conflict recovery (A/Res/60/180: Para. 4).

<sup>32</sup> “But the real work of the Commission will be in its country-specific committees where participation will be tailored to each case – to involve country representatives as well as all the relevant contributors such as regional organizations, regional banks and international financial institutions.” [<http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm>] (last viewed: 12.02.06).

proposals to address gender representation in this nearly always purely male body, which is another serious problem.

The March 2005 session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) also provided little occasion for optimism. Particularly in many Western-oriented countries, there has been a tendency toward a worsening climate for women's rights advocacy since the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing. The international women's movement is occupied with combating Christian and Islamic fundamentalist movements, which weakens it considerably. As such, the results of attempts to implement gender policy in the UN are mixed. Much has been achieved on paper, but it will take longer to put these norms into practice.

### **3.2. The Security Concept in the European Union**

The changes in the international power structure and in the security policy debate sketched above have led to changes in the European Union's concept of security policy as well. Europe has developed from a "peace power," as the EU has viewed itself since its inception, to a new determinant for global force and order.

The end of the Cold War brought about a shift in the division of labor among the USA, NATO, and what was then the EC. Although advocated by some civil society organizations, NATO was not demilitarized and disbanded. With the advent of new intra- and interstate armed conflicts, adherents of an "expanded notion of security" gained the upper hand. This concept became the basis for legitimizing further NATO activities, as well as the foundation for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The notion of "expanded security," however, is completely gender-blind. The ESDP and CFSP thus stand in opposition to the EU's Treaty of Amsterdam of May 1, 1999, an amendment to the European Treaties, which is a binding directive for European institutions to actively promote gender equality. Even if the draft of the European Constitution was not ratified by all EU state members, it is important to address the positive and negative implications it has for a peace and security policy, which should not be overlooked in a new formulation of the constitution. One positive aspect is that the draft of the Constitution refers to the Treaty of Amsterdam and defines gender equality as an objective. Overall, ESDP and CFSP ignore these directives as well as UN Resolution 1325. Extremely negative, on the other hand, is that the draft of the Constitution, instead of outright banning wars of aggression, specifies the obligation of member states to expand their capacity for military intervention. Regrettably, this corresponds to the EU's

current security strategy. The aim of the EU to be a “peace power” is thus contradicted by this provision.

### **The European Security Strategy**

In contrast to previous security policies of most of the individual European states, the notion of “expanded security” has a global orientation. Yet unlike the idea of human security, it still remains oriented to narrowly defined national or EU interests. Threats to security are viewed as that with the potential to endanger the stability of Western-oriented states. A threat, therefore, does not have to be real. The EU formulated its first common foreign and security policy in December 2003 in a strategy paper entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” and then spelled it out in the “Headline Goal 2010” adopted in 2004. Five key threats were listed: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure in specific regions of the world, and organized crime that develops in its wake.<sup>33</sup> For the first time, environmental catastrophes, disasters, diseases, and epidemics were relegated to secondary importance. This weighting of threats contrasts with the threat scenarios in a UN context, which are more strongly oriented toward the concept of “human security.” In general, as in other EU documents, there is a complete absence of cause analyses for the formulated threats. Although it does not lie within the scope of such documents to perform such analyses themselves, they should articulate clear criteria for civil and military interventions. Every intervention should be preceded by a cause analysis that also takes a look at gender relations. In the EU Security Strategy, women figure only as objects in need of protection, for example in connection with trafficking. They are not conceived of as active subjects. The EU Security Strategy is oriented toward military intervention, not only to protect the EU zone, but in also other regions of the world. True, “none of [the new threats] can be tackled by purely military means,”<sup>34</sup> and “preventive engagement” is to play an important role, but a comparison of the funding for civil and military conflict management shows that the emphasis lies heavily on the latter (even though the EU is the world’s largest funder of the former).

The EU has yet to clearly stipulate when and how to proceed with military interventions. Differing positions emerged in particular during the 2003 Iraq War. The current strategy paper also leaves open questions regarding joint decision-making and intervention procedures; it simply calls for “greater coherence” based on “joint actions.” The “Headline Goal 2010” stipulates that these questions should be clarified in a binding manner by that year. It is already clear that EU forces will be called upon to

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<sup>33</sup> Council of the European Union (2003): A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy, I., pp. 3-5, at: [[http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=DE&mode=g](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=DE&mode=g)]

<sup>34</sup> *ibid*, II. p. 7

perform a greater combination of military and civil tasks. Military forces are being asked to feature “interoperability” as a major new quality “to enhance the effective use of military capabilities,” allowing them “to work together and to interact with other civilian tools.”<sup>35</sup> This process depends to a large degree on the type of cooperation between civil and military organizations. If EU forces do in fact take over tasks that were handled by civil actors in the past, we may expect a progressive militarization of crisis and conflict management

A comparison between this strategic security, the first independent document of its type in the history of the EU, with the “National Security Strategy” announced by President Bush in September 2002 yields parallels in the respective counter-terrorism measures as well as in the notion of a uniform military doctrine for different crisis and conflict situations. The EU’s new security policy agenda has emerged partly in agreement with and partly in opposition to that of the USA. The USA urged the EU to assume military obligations within the NATO framework both inside and outside Europe. It can be feared that the combination of partnership with and competition between the EU and the USA will lead to an arms escalation. For this reason it is even more important that the EU reflect on its founding vision of peace and commit to the provisions of the UN Charter, which preclude every war of aggression and require a UN mandate for every form of intervention.

### **Security Policy in the Draft for a European Constitution**

Even though we can assume that the draft for a European Constitution will not be ratified in its present form, it is worth taking a critical look at the principles of the EU security policy formulated in it, as they are indicative of a political trend that should be opposed. This draft features a new quality in EU armament policy and thus provides additional impetus toward militarization. Although Article I-3 states that the primary aim of the Union is to “promote peace,” this stands in contrast to a series of subsequent articles. The problem in general is that this draft constitution not only stakes out the scope for political debates in the area of security policy – as a constitution is expected to do – but also makes “major preliminary decisions” that violate the principles of democracy, rule of law, and commitment to peace as framed in the German constitution.<sup>36</sup>

#### **Military Obligations in the Draft for a European Constitution**

Constitution treaty:

<sup>35</sup> Council of the European Union (2004): Headline Goal 2010. Document 6309/6/04, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> Altvater, Elmar/ Fisahn, Andreas/ Gerstenberger, Heide/ Huffs Schmid, Jörg/ Karrass, Anne / Mahnkopf, Birgit (without date): Eine andere Verfassung ist möglich. Anforderungen an eine europäische Verfassung – Positionen der EU-AG des wissenschaftlichen Beirates von Attac Deutschland, , p.3

**I-40** European Council/ Council of Ministers decides on military operations  
**I-41, § 3** Agency for defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments  
**I-41, § 3** Progressive improvement in military capabilities  
**I-47, § 4** Citizens' initiatives  
**III-309** Support for "third countries in combating terrorism in their territories," including by military force  
**III-309** List of missions, operations with civil and military means  
**III-310** No UN mandate necessary, operations in "third countries" possible (cf. section/ Kap.# I-41 (1))  
**III-311** Defense agency to implement useful measures for strengthening the defense sector  
**III-376** No checks by the EU Court

Source: For the text of the draft for a European Constitution see: [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/de/fartp95\\_de.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/de/fartp95_de.htm)

(This draft has not been ratified by all the member states)

Thus the member states agree to a general increase in military capabilities (I-41, Para. 3) and to support "third countries in combating terrorism in their territories," including by military force (III-309). The Council of Ministers has sole decision-making power over any military operations (I-40, III-309). The EU Parliament is excluded from the decision-making process, and EU citizens have no say in questions of war and peace. There is also no provision for having these decisions examined by the European Court (III-376). An "agency for defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armament" (I-41, Para. 3) is to be established solely in the interest of defense, and this European Defense Agency is to strengthen the defense sector (III-311). It is not clear whether this agency will support the European arms market or have its own political mandate. As a general feature, the EU draft constitution significantly affects the sovereignty of the member states, because it, like EU law in general, is to take priority over the constitutions of the member states (Art. 1-6). Moreover, in Art. III-309 and Art. II-310, Para. 1, it questions the UN monopoly on the legitimate use of force. International law stipulates that a UN mandate is needed for every military intervention in third countries, yet this is not reflected in the draft of a European Constitution. Art. I-41 (1), which is based on Art. III, envisions missions conducted outside the EU "in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter," but not necessarily under a UN mandate.

This restriction on sovereignty creates a structural conflict with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (*Grundgesetz*). According to Articles 24 and 87a of the *Grundgesetz*, German armed forces may only be employed to defend the country or as part of a collective security system, and German soldiers may only be sent on a foreign mission following a resolution by the German Parliament (*Bundestag*). It is to be feared that pressure exerted by the EU and the federal government could be too great to ensure an independent decision on the part of the Parliament.

To sum up, the current EU draft constitution and the already valid EU Security Strategy reveal a profound change in the EU's priorities and aims of action – in the absence of widespread public

discussion and social consensus. The EU no longer defines itself exclusively as a civil power, but as a military power.

A final rejection of the draft of the European Constitution would nevertheless not provide a forward-looking solution since the core elements of the security policy are also anchored in the unanimously agreed European Security Strategy and have already been applied by the member states and NATO. In this respect, we need to expound the problems of the deficits in democracy and gender democracy that exist in current EU policies and formulate constitutional alternatives. In doing so, feminist criticism needs to insist on a notion of security based on human rights as opposed to the prevailing notion of “expanded security.”

Priority must always be given to the UN system and the provisions of the UN Charter if a foreign and security policy is to be credible and gender-equitable. The UN must be recognized as the sole decision-maker for all crisis prevention and conflict management operations. This would substantially validate the EU’s commitment to international law. At the same time the EU should view its mission of peace in terms of its “responsibility to protect” and participate in civil interventions to establish the rule of law in third countries in line with its “right to intervene.” UN Resolution 1325 must be implemented, particularly as it corresponds with EU directives on gender equality and gender mainstreaming. In the discussion over revamping the UN Security Council and expanding the number of permanent seats, EU member states must also strive to achieve a joint seat in order to broaden its democratic legitimation, and in line with European unification and the express will of the Union to play a strong role in the world.

### **3.3. The Paradigm Shift in German Peace and Security Policy**

The EU security policy sketched above represents a paradigm shift from a policy of defense to one of intervention, which in turn affects policy at the level of the member states. In Germany, it has already brought about a restructuring of the military – currently underway – into a rapid deployment intervention force. Here, too, the focus is on “international conflict prevention and crisis management – including the fight against international terrorism.”<sup>37</sup> The Defense Minister at that time, Peter Struck, provided a vivid description of this change in policy back in December of 2002 when he stated that “the security of the Federal Republic of Germany will also be defended in the Hindu Kush.” The Germany military is also blurring the boundaries between civil and military operations and is expanding its responsibilities to include the civil sector as well as the fields of development and

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<sup>37</sup> Defense policy guidelines, issued by German Defense Minister Dr. Peter Struck on 21 May 2003.

foreign policy. This, too, reveals the difficulties inherent in a security policy that combines civil and military interventions and that at the same time has insufficient expertise in the area of gender relations. These problems were evident in the deployment of German troops in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, German soldiers make up a part of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and the KSK (*Kommando Spezialkräfte* – Special Commando Forces). As a NATO force, ISAF does peacekeeping and peacebuilding work. The actual activities of the KSK are not transparent, however, and this has prompted public criticism, but so far without any impact. It is generally known that Afghan women continue to experience extreme violence, both outside and within their homes. But the predominantly male “internationals” working in the country still have little perception of it. They are not in the position to enact gender-appropriate measures that also enlist men to support the participation of women in public spaces or to protect threatened women. German peacekeeping forces do not receive any gender-awareness training.<sup>38</sup> Gender issues are not a part of the training for foreign deployment and definitely not part of the deployment strategy.

The fact that women have now joined German combat units has had little or no effect on traditional notions of masculinity in the German military. This immediately becomes clear from the regulation stipulating that gender equality has been achieved when women make up 15 percent of these units.<sup>39</sup> The “critical mass” of a 30 percent minority that could bring about qualitative change is deliberately avoided. An exception to the military-dominated concept of German security policy is the “Action Plan for Civil Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding” passed in 2004 by the SPD/Green coalition government. This plan focuses on civil conflict management with a strategic emphasis on promoting the rule of law and democracy in crisis countries. It expressly mentions the necessity of women’s participation “in power structures and their full inclusion in all efforts surrounding crisis prevention and conflict resolution” as prerequisites for the peaceful reconstruction of a democratic constitutional state. It calls for measures to increase the participation of the civil society and in particular gender-sensitive non-governmental organizations. In contrast to German military training, the Action Plan has introduced the criteria of “gender-sensitive behavior” to its police training. Yet its significance can be judged by its funding. The 2005 German military budget consisted of approximately 24 billion euros, while around 16 million euros were made available for civil peace services.

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. section 4.2. Preparation for Foreign Operations

<sup>39</sup> “Soldatinnen und Soldaten Gleichstellungsgesetz” (German law stipulating equality between female and male soldiers).

The Action Plan at least represents a positive touchstone for a gender-oriented approach, and it also makes reference to UN Resolution 1325. In addition, it includes approaches for utilizing actors from civil society and their respective expertise. Yet without adequate funding, these approaches will remain without impact.

#### **Action Plan for Civil Conflict Prevention**

On May 12, 2004, the German federal cabinet approved the “Action Plan for Civil Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.” This is one of the few foundational documents on German foreign and security policy that spans all government departments. As a cabinet resolution, it ranks above the defense policy guidelines, which are acknowledged by the cabinet but apply only to the administrative area of the Federal Ministry of Defense. This also explains why the Action Plan is not a completed project but rather a collection of 163 actions to be implemented in the next five to ten years.

The Action Plan incorporates a gender perspective in relation to the question of women’s participation in power structures. In promoting democracy and the rule of law in crisis areas, it incorporates gender as a strategic objective and explicitly mentions the necessity of women’s participation “in power structures and their full inclusion in all efforts surrounding crisis prevention and conflict resolution” as prerequisites for the peaceful reconstruction of a democratic constitutional state. In the chapter on the role of civil society, it also advocates support for gender-sensitive non-governmental organizations. In contrast to military training programs, the Action Plan lists “gender-sensitive behavior” as a criterion for the training of police personnel. Thus a gender perspective does exist in individual demands of the Action Plan. On the other hand, the Action Plan lacks a gender perspective in its underlying expanded notion of security, as well as in the chapter on culture and education. It also fails to address ways of implementing UN Resolution 1325 at the national level. Further difficulties arise regarding the implementation of the Action Plan. To ensure its implementation, the German Foreign Ministry created under its supervision a “Council on Civil Conflict Prevention,” which consists of the commissioners in charge of civil conflict prevention from each relevant ministry. This council formed an advisory board to act as an intermediary between the federal government and civil society. It contains representatives from non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and the private sector (Siemens, BASF, Deutsche Bank), but no women’s policy organizations. Since the advisory board is not itself a policymaking body, it depends on close cooperation with the administration and the Parliament.

The council itself is made up of the Germany Foreign Ministry, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and the Federal Ministry of Defense. This already presents a coordination problem due to conflicts of interest among the ministries. The idea of mainstreaming conflict prevention policy has yet to find widespread support among these collaborators. In reality, the Action Plan’s demand for coherence runs up against considerable resistance due to differing interests and bureaucratic cultures.

A further handicap is that the Action Plan is understaffed and lacks resources. The office of the commissioner in charge of civil conflict prevention consists of a single part-time position. In Germany, inter-ministerial funds for crisis prevention do not yet exist, as they do for example in Great Britain. Since 2001, Great Britain has maintained a “Global Conflict Prevention Pool” with a budget of 71 million pounds, which is roughly 102 million euros. In Germany, the budget for conflict prevention, peace maintenance, and conflict resolution was 16 million euros in 2005; in 2004 it was just under 14 million euros. An especially problematic note with regard to this tight budget is that it contains no clear allocation of resources for the Action Plan’s projects. It is unclear how and to what extent the projects will be funded. The federal government is expected to present a report on civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping at two-year intervals in order to clarify the ministries’ implementation of the Action Plan’s aims and recommendations.

Original document at: [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv\\_km/aktionsplan.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv_km/aktionsplan.html)

The former German Red-Green government constantly extolled the idea of civil conflict prevention, yet given the insufficient funding provided to civil conflict prevention measures, its commitment to this stated priority seems less than credible. Since the autumn of 2005, the CDU/CSU and SPD governing coalition has set in motion a discussion process on security

policy issues that portends an even stronger focus on military force in German security policy. Its white paper on security policy and the future of the German military will be presented in 2006 and will stipulate the tasks of the institutions responsible for security as well as the type of cooperation among them.<sup>40</sup> The consequences of a military-dominated security and defense policy on civil conflict management and prevention mechanisms and institutions remain to be seen. The discussion process in the context of this white paper calls for vigilant feminist monitoring and critique.

### **Institutions of Civil Conflict Management**

In Germany, there are a number of projects and institutions in the field of civil conflict management – relatively unknown to the public – which have had a tremendous impact with comparatively little funding, thereby saving enormous costs. In 2005, the budget allocated by the Foreign Ministry for “crisis prevention, peacekeeping, and conflict management” increased by more than 3 million euros from the previous year to 15.7 million euros.

The following is a brief description of these projects and institutions:

#### **ZIF:**

The Center for International Peace Operations (*Zentrum für Internationale Friedeneinsätze*) in Berlin was established in June 2002. ZIF’s core mandate is to build a pool of 1,000 German civil professionals for short- and medium-term deployment in peacekeeping and election observation missions conducted by the UN, EU, and OSCE. With its combination of training, recruitment, and support of civil personnel, ZIF is unique worldwide. ZIF is funded by the Foreign Ministry and has an annual budget of 2 million euros.

**ZIVIK:** is German for Civil Conflict Management (*Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung*). A project by the same name is organized by the Institute for Foreign Relations (*Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen*) and funded by the Foreign Ministry. ZIVIK works as an intermediary for non-governmental organizations working in the field of civil conflict management, to facilitate their access to public funds. It supports Peace Brigades International in Colombia (whose volunteers accompany and protect human rights activists), a dialogue process with moderate Islamists in Tajikistan, demobilization and reintegration projects, and democratic media. In 2005, the activities sponsored by the Institute for Foreign Relations were funded with approximately 2 million euros.

**ZFD:** The Civil Peace Service (*Ziviler Friedensdienst*) was founded by an initiative of peace groups, and has been supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) since 1999. Qualified experts support local partners in crisis regions in overcoming enmity and developing peace-promoting structures through intermediary services in lower and medium levels of society. In 2005, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development increased ZFD’s budget to 14.5 million euros.

**DSF:** The last federal government resumed federal funding of peace research, which has at times been suspended. In its fifth year of existence in 2005, the German Foundation for Peace Research (*Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung*) funds research projects and provides grants to young scholars. In 2003, the DSF succeeded in persuading the Defense Ministry to fund it with a million euros for the first time.

**CIVPOL:** The participation of German police personnel in UN and EU international peacekeeping operations has become an important, but relatively unknown, permanent mission. In 2005, Germany supported international peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Georgia, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Afghanistan with the deployment of 400 police personnel. In Afghanistan, Germany has assumed the leading role for rebuilding and training the Afghani police force. In postwar societies, supporting and developing a monopoly on the legitimate force of power based on the rule of law has strategic importance. The German contribution to this process has been exemplary.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. [http://www.bundesregierung.de/Nachrichten\\_-12404.996180/interview/Verteidigung-neu-definieren.htm](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Nachrichten_-12404.996180/interview/Verteidigung-neu-definieren.htm), 29 May 2006

**GTZ:** The German Society for Technical Cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*) has been commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to establish the project “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management.” The aim of the project is to further develop concepts and instruments for crisis prevention, conflict management, and peace development, as well as their application in development cooperation.

Sources: [<http://www.ifa.de/zivik/>], [<http://www.zif-berlin.org/>], [[www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/](http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/)], [[www.civpol.org/](http://www.civpol.org/)], [<http://www.bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/>], [<http://www.gtz.de/de/themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/3947.htm>]

## **4. Perspectives for Practical Implementation**

### **4.1. The OSCE as a Model for a Peace-Oriented Security Policy**

The activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can serve as a starting point for effective peace policy. Between 1990 and 1995, that is, during the first and second Balkan Wars and to some extent afterwards, the OSCE commissioned more than 20 peacekeeping missions that successfully carried out crisis prevention and conflict regulation work. From the Baltic to Southern Georgia, OSCE missions, consisting of representatives from government and civil society, pursued forward-looking peace policies and thus a substantially different agenda from that of NATO. In its own words, the work of the OSCE is based on a three-dimensional concept of security that comprises political/military, economic/environmental, and human security. It lists early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-crisis management as concrete fields of action.

This organization has clearly shown how wars can be prevented. But it has received little public recognition. Instead, it has been increasingly relegated to political obscurity in recent years. This is due in part to the low media value of “non-events” such as preventing the escalation of violent conflict. Furthermore, with its priority on democracy and respect for human rights, the OSCE has proven to be a disturbance for some of its member states, starting with Russia. This has prompted some of these states to restrict the OSCE’s human rights monitoring activities. Like many international organizations, the OSCE faces enormous budget constraints – in light of the objectives it is supposed to achieve. Although the OSCE budget has increased from the 21 million euros it was allocated in 1994, it has declined slightly since 2000, and it consisted of approximately 169 million euros in 2005. As a comparison, the Federal Republic of Germany had a 2005 defense budget of 24 billion euros. The OSCE budget therefore amounts to just about 0.75 percent of the German defense budget.

The OSCE passed an “Action Plan for Gender Issues” back in June 2005, that is, before the Security Council passed UN Resolution 1325 with similar content in October of that year. In quite precise terms, it shows that nonviolent and non-military missions can only succeed if the gender dimensions of

both the missions themselves and the civil societies in the conflict regions are taken into account. Yet the OSCE's concrete practice has lagged behind its action plan in many respects. Change only takes place slowly, especially given that the OSCE's first problem is to have its missions approved by all the member states, and then to launch and maintain them on site.

## **4.2. Preparation for Foreign Operations**

### **Gender Mainstreaming in Education and Further Training for Civil and Military Personnel in Conflict Management**

Promoting nonviolent forms of conflict resolution and preventing violations of human rights in conflict situations were stated objectives of the Platform for Action drafted at the UN Conference on Women in Beijing. To achieve this, the governments of the signatory nations as well as international and regional organizations are to implement the following measures: "Take into account gender-sensitive concerns in developing training programs for all relevant personnel on international humanitarian law and human rights awareness and recommend such training for those involved in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, with a view to preventing violence against women, in particular."

For peacekeeping missions to be successful, gender awareness must be integrated into the education and further training of military and civil peacekeeping personnel, including police units. The UN Security Council is also convinced of this point, expressing the following position on education in Points 6 and 7 of Resolution 1325. It "requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights, and particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements ... into their national training programs for military and civil police personnel in preparation for deployment and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civil personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training." And it "urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical, and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts..."

In the meantime, various international organizations have recognized the importance of gender awareness for their work in crisis areas, developed specific training measures, and published the relevant materials – generally on the Internet.<sup>41</sup> One good example is the "Gender and Peace Support Operations" training course developed in 2000 by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the British Department for International Development (DFID), which

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41 Cf. for example International Alert

was also placed on the Internet as an online course. This course is designed for both civil and military peacekeeping personnel, and provides gender-sensitive approaches as well as information about treaties on human rights and women's rights.

Building on these materials, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) developed the "Gender and Peacekeeping Operations In-Mission Training" program. This course was designed for participants in UN foreign operations as well as for military personnel and civil police at the national level. The course has been tested in a pilot project and then optimized.

Thus far, gender training has only been exemplary in nature. For UN peacekeeping operations, personnel are now trained on-site by mobile "Mission Training Cells" staffed by military instructors. DKPO course material has been included in the introductory program for new peacekeeping personnel in operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Eritrea (UNMEE), East Timor (UNTEAT), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

#### **Practical Gender Training in East Timor and Eritrea**

"During the test training of the gender material in East Timor and Eritrea, the trainer found that she did not have enough current, context-specific information on the conflicts in those countries, or the unfolding of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). For this reason she decided to open the gender training sessions to both the military peacekeepers and the local populations, as a means of having the local men and women to provide their analyses and stories. During the trainings the trainer found that the most profound learning came about when local civilians participated in the training sessions with the military peacekeepers, because it gave all participants an idea of how the conflict and PSO had affected them and the role of gender within those experiences and structures. The trainer found that often this was the first time that military peacekeepers had actually spoken with the local people or heard their perspectives. This is an important and useful way of developing an understanding of gender issues within the operation and the host society."

Source: McKay, Susan and Mazurana, Dyan (2001). *Raising Women's Voices for Peacebuilding*. London.

The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) also offers three-day seminars for civil personnel entitled "Training for Civilian Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations on the Special Needs of Women and Children in and after Conflict." These have been held one time each for UN missions in Bosnia (UNMIBH), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTEAT), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Haiti (MINUSTAH), and Burundi (ONUB).

At least in theory, the United Nations does not want to remain at the level of providing separate courses on gender, but rather intends to integrate gender awareness into all of its further training

programs. It views further training as an essential instrument of gender mainstreaming, in order to develop gender sensitivity and expertise.<sup>42</sup>

The development of gender sensitivity and expertise rests on three levels of education and further training: motivation, knowledge, and skills. The first task, therefore, is to build motivation, namely for participants to view equality as a goal of their own work. This requires an awareness of (potentially) discriminatory structures. The second step is for them to become knowledgeable about gender aspects in their own area of work. Third, the participants must acquire the skills to act in a way that promotes equality.

Most of the gender training programs currently available have been designed as separate modules, with an emphasis on raising awareness and acquiring knowledge. For gender mainstreaming to be implemented in a sustainable manner, however, it is precisely the third step that is needed, namely the skills to promote gender equality in practice, regardless of whether they are applied to providing initial humanitarian assistance, re-establishing “public order” or structures for the state or civil society, or instituting long-term development cooperation measures.

The goal of integrating a gender perspective into the education and further training of military and civil peacekeeping personnel by UN member states such as Germany is far from being achieved. In its 2004 report to the UN Secretary-General on the implementing Resolution 1325, the German government stated that it had complied with the request by the Security Council to provide voluntary financial support for gender sensitivity training, by funding the DPKO project on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations” in 2002 with 60,000 euros. The same report, however, shows that DPKO materials have yet to be used in Germany. There is no special gender training as part of the preparation for peacekeeping operations, nor are gender aspects integrated into other training programs. In its report on the implementation of Resolution 1325, the German government does not discuss the training program at the Foreign Office<sup>43</sup> nor the qualification program offered for peacekeeping personnel by the Civil Peace Service (*Ziviler Friedensdienst*) maintained by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.<sup>44</sup> The only training program it mentions is a paper published by the *Zentrum Innere Führung* (a post-WWII institute in the German military concerned with the legitimation, integration, and identity of its soldiers) entitled “Making

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. ECOSOC document (1997): Mainstreaming the gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system, p. 32 ; at: [<http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/docs/1997/e1997-66.htm>]

<sup>43</sup> Conducted by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF).

<sup>44</sup> Conducted by various non-governmental agencies, including the Association of Peace Service Initiatives (AGDF - *Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst für den Frieden e.V.*)

Decisions and Taking Responsibility – Conflict Situations in Operations Abroad” (*Entscheiden und Verantworten – Konfliktsituationen in Auslandseinsätzen, 2003*). This seminar material is intended to promote “confident behavior on the part of male and female soldiers” in crisis situations abroad. Given that it completely lacks any treatment of gender issues, however, this publication will hardly succeed in even introducing gender awareness. Even if the German report does not mention them, there are a few committed actors in Germany such as ZIVIK that are making efforts to integrate gender aspects into their regular education and further training programs.<sup>45</sup> However, the criteria ZIVIK gives for evaluating projects remain gender-blind.<sup>46</sup>

## 5. Conclusions

### 5.1. Peaceful Differences – Feminist Roads to Peace

The future challenge to peace-oriented policy-making lies in establishing a permanent basis for addressing differences by nonviolent means, both on national and international levels. As such, we agree with Mary Kaldor’s conclusion in her book on the “new wars”: “Exclusionist policy must be countered by alternative, future-oriented cosmopolitan strategies that bridge gaps between global and local concerns and re-establish legitimacy on the basis of democratic, inclusion-oriented values.”<sup>47</sup>

Peace-oriented policy must address three dilemmas: the “dilemma of equality” (equal treatment of unequal subjects perpetuates inequality), the “dilemma of difference” (unequal treatment of difference institutionalizes precisely the difference discriminated against), and the “dilemma of identity” (substantive group identities tend to exclude the non-identical). Peacebuilding personnel have to be aware of these incongruities and asynchronicities if they want to transform violent relationships into peaceful ones. This requires that democracy be understood in a way that allows for differences, yet without biological determination of gender roles or the exclusion of certain groups, which thus violates their human rights. This in turn requires a carefully cultivated political “space between us,” as described in the conclusion to a study by Cynthia Cockburn on cooperation among women in Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland. These women’s groups emphasize their differences as opposed to glossing over them; they directly address these political differences in characteristics; they avoid polarization; they acknowledge injustice committed in the name of ethnic segregation; they give

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. for example the ZIVIK workshop “Civil Conflict Management: Project Management Made Easy,” 20 September 2005, Berlin.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Rahmenkonzept für die Evaluation von FEM-NRO-Projekten. December 2002.

<sup>47</sup> Kaldor, Mary (2000): *Neue und alte Kriege. Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*. Frankfurt a. Main, p.22 (translation).

themselves clearly defined goals. The group process thus becomes a locus for generating precisely this democratic space:

“A good deal of effort therefore goes into structuring a comfortable democratic distance between us, as individuals in marriage, as collectivities in a multicultural city, as nations sharing a world. The space has to afford an optimal distance between difference, small enough for mutual knowledge, for dispelling myths, but big enough for comfort. It has to be strong enough to prevent implosion, a collapse of differences into rape, silencing or annihilation. But it also has to be flexible enough to permit differences to change their form and significance (...).”<sup>48</sup>

It is this “space between us” which is one of the most challenging but at the same time indispensable conditions for peace based on gender equality. When conflict escalates, it can only be maintained with effort, but such microprocesses form the basis for a culture of conflict that is democratic, gender-equitable, and nonviolent. Resources must be devoted to promoting and maintaining it, in order to prevent the need for high-casualty, hazardous, and costly military operations in the first place.

## **5.2. Strengthening International Law and International Peace Norms**

The ban on violence in international law must be reinforced at all levels. This includes reforming the United Nations, which for all its imperfections, is without alternative. The UN Security Council must be reinforced and extended in its capacities for reserving world peace. If conflicts arise, all preventive, political, economic and diplomatic means must be utilized in full to avoid the escalation of violence. If these do not succeed, there must be clearly defined criteria and objectives for military operations that may only be performed with a Security Council mandate. From a human rights perspective – as described above – the international community is called upon to address human rights violations taking place in the context of violent conflicts or failing states at a very early stage. To do so, the international community has a wide repertoire of measures available to it, yet most of them go unused. A military intervention, even when performed with a Security Council mandate, is always a poor solution, because it is not preventive, but instead is employed only after human rights have already been gravely violated. Moreover, violence always tends to generate more violence. Nevertheless, there must be clearly defined criteria for military interventions. One of these criteria is that military operations may only be carried out by states that provide troops specially trained for these purposes. Gender and

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<sup>48</sup> Cockburn, Cynthia (1998): *The Space between Us. Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*. London.

intercultural expertise as well as experience in civil conflict management are indispensable. We entirely reject operations without a UN mandate, whether by NATO or the planned European deployment force. In addition, emphasis must be placed on civil peacekeeping measures. These too must be performed by trained personnel, and incorporate gender sensitivity and expertise as a central aspect. Every UN mission should strive to fully implement Resolution 1325. This in turn requires action plans for implementation in both the member states and the UN. Civil society organizations with demonstrated gender sensitivity must be commissioned to develop these plans. An action plan on the international level could also serve as an example for similar action plans in the individual member states.

### **5.3. Peace and Security from a Gender and Feminist Perspective**

To establish security following a violent conflict, the culture of violence must be thoroughly transformed in light of gender-specific and feminist perspectives. The state plays a two-sided role in this complex process. It provides security on the one hand, yet its gender-blind structures also pose specific potential threats for women and girls. When violence escalates, the rule of law often disintegrates. Two of the greatest challenges in conflict management are to disempower violent actors and to restore a functioning rule of law. These objectives are particularly important for women due to the fact that sexualized violence also increases in violent contexts. It is thus in women's interests to restore the state's legitimate monopoly on force and to penalize each individual act of violence.

While the state can act as a guarantor of security for women, it can also be a source of insecurity. Every security strategy, therefore, must be examined for the effects it has on different genders and population groups. Security must include legally guaranteed protection against sexualized violence, which means passing the requisite legislation, training police forces, sensitizing judges, and setting up shelters and hotlines. Both men and women must have opportunities to address the traumas of war and sexualized violence. Victims of violence require special support, while perpetrators must be publicly condemned within the context of the legal system if the culture of violence in postwar societies is to be transformed. Prerequisites for this include a broad concept of security, sensitized police and justice system personnel, improved protection for victims, and support for witnesses. The most important allies in this process are the local initiatives that address the often taboo subject of sexualized violence in ways that fit their respective cultural and political contexts.

Different needs must also be addressed when demobilizing male and female combatants. There must be different integration programs for women and men to counteract social ostracism if they do not wish to revert to old gender roles.

## **5.4. Concrete Demands**

We demand that the gender perspective be incorporated into all deliberations, documents, practical concepts and their implementation as a central category and important factor for sustainable political strategies, conflict prevention, and management measures. We also demand that this perspective be taken seriously and be applied by all actors. To do so, the use of gender-specific data, particularly for conflict analysis, is indispensable.

Credible and gender-equitable strategies for conflict prevention and a peace-oriented security policy can only be pursued successfully if adequate funding is made available. This means dramatically increasing the funds for civil crisis prevention at the expense of the armament and defense budget. Otherwise instruments such as national plans of action remain empty declarations of intent.

This means drawing up a **Gender Action Plan**, which must contain the following points:

### **I. Basic Demands for Foreign and Security Policy**

1. Prevention instead of intervention; civil measures instead of military measures.
2. Application of a concept of security based on an understanding of “human security” and human rights that integrates the gender dimension.
3. Incorporation of all social groups in peacekeeping and security policy considerations, concepts, and measures. This also includes the participation of civil society organizations in discussions and decisions about postwar regulations.
4. The development of a Gender Index for foreign and security policy. It specifies the criteria for a gender-sensitive concept of security, for identifying violence against women, and for including women in peacekeeping/building missions and democratization processes.
5. Regular collection and use of gender-specific data, e.g., for conflict and actor analyses
6. Regular international meetings of experts on war-related sexualized violence

### **II. Required measures in crisis, conflict, and postwar regions**

7. Anchoring of equal rights for women in peace treaties and postwar constitutions, including the implementation of women quotas.

8. Comprehensive implementation of gender mainstreaming in all peacebuilding operations in crisis regions.
9. Establishment of institutions to monitor human rights in postwar societies.
10. Trauma-sensitive medical and psychosocial support for survivors of sexualized war violence, which especially strengthen the potential of women and girls.
11. Reintegration programs for ex-combatants, to support both men and women in re-entering civil life.

### **III. Demands to be implemented in the United Nations reform process:**

12. Higher valuation and strengthening of institutions and conventions in the UN system that promote women's rights, such as CSW, UNIFEM, and CEDAW. These institutions must be consulted by the Security Council before it passes a resolution, and must be included in the Peacebuilding Commission.
13. Stronger institutional anchoring of crisis prevention in the UN system that enables preventive action beyond the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission.
14. Pass a binding list of criteria, explicitly based on human rights, that define Security Council authorization of so-called humanitarian interventions.
15. Establishment of a monitoring office within the UN system that oversees the implementation of Resolution 1325, with the participation of NGOs and civil society representatives.
16. Development of standards, clear deadlines, and a list of criteria for evaluating the implementation of UN Resolution 1325. It should also include a precise definition of what "appropriate" participation by women means in different countries (see Demand 17), what the evaluation criteria are, whether the measures introduced have achieved success as envisioned by the resolution, etc., as well as a targeted campaign to increase motivation to implement acquired knowledge and insights.
17. A supplementary provision to UN Resolution 1325 requiring that women hold at least 40 percent of all offices and positions in peace processes, and applying this percentage to all UN leadership positions as well.
18. Establishment of pools of national and international gender-sensitive experts to implement Resolution 1325 in postwar countries.
19. Establishment of a UN trust fund to support women peace activists throughout the world.
20. Sending UN observers to postwar regions to monitor postwar processes and humanitarian conditions.
21. Compliance with existing behavioral codes stipulating that UN members not abuse or exploit local populations, and strict prosecution in the event of violation.

#### **IV. The following must be implemented on the EU level:**

22. (Military) interventions carried out by EU troops must be sanctioned by a UN mandate.
23. Establishment of a disarmament agency or a civil conflict prevention agency instead of expanding the scope of the defense agency.
24. Establishment of a permanent budget for immediate non-bureaucratic aid to traumatized women and girls, men and boys in or from crisis regions who flee to the Federal Republic of Germany or another EU country.

#### **V. The following must be implemented in the Federal Republic of Germany:**

25. The Federal Republic of Germany must resolutely pursue a human rights agenda. Governments that systematically violate women's rights should be apprised of these abuses – in close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the Economic Ministry – by all diplomatic means. If necessary, economic relations must be terminated.
26. The budget for gender-equitable civil conflict prevention and management must be substantially increased vis-à-vis the defense budget in order to achieve a credible peace-oriented security policy.
27. Making aid for development assistance institutions that work in war, crisis, and postwar regions conditional on their demonstrable gender sensitivity and expertise.
28. Generation of reports at two-year intervals on civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding that provide detailed information on how the federal ministries have implemented the objectives and recommendations of the Action Plan for Civil Conflict Management. If objectives are not met, the reports will list the reasons as well as precise measures for prompt achievement.
29. Systematic promotion of gender-sensitive studies on foreign and security policy as it relates to conditions in individual countries.
30. A national action plan will be promptly drawn up for implementing UN Resolution 1325. Appropriate support for meetings of national and international experts as well as relevant networks for the purpose of expediting the implementation of Resolution 1325.
31. Establishment of a national monitoring office to oversee the implementation of Resolution 1325, with participation by civil society groups.
32. Members of the German military and civil society organizations serving the Federal Republic of Germany will not be sent on foreign missions unless they can demonstrate gender sensitivity and expertise. The percentage of women in peacekeeping forces (and in all other relevant assignments) will be increased to 40 or 50 percent.
33. The materials developed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will be used to prepare national personnel for foreign missions; equality-oriented and gender-competent education and further training courses will be ensured for military, police, and civil peacekeeping personnel; deployment of civil peacekeeping experts in particular will be promoted and increased;

the evaluation of all education and further training courses from the gender perspective will be ensured.

34. Development of consistent strategies to counter sexualized and domestic violence in crisis regions and postwar societies, and promotion of cooperation between them and corresponding domestic initiatives (e.g. for German soldiers).
35. German soldiers as well as military and civil personnel who violate behavioral codes and laws, in particular acts of sexualized violence, while on a foreign mission will be strictly prosecuted.

## **6. Appendix**

### **6.1. Abbreviations**

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
EG	Europäische Gemeinschaft (European Community/EC)
EU	Europäische Union (European Union)
EWG	Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (European Economic Community/EEC)
EZLN	Ejercito Zapatista de la Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de la Liberacion Nacional (Sandinistic Liberation Front)
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KSK	Kommando Spezialkräfte (Commando Special Forces)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSZE	Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe/OSCE)
PSO	Peace Support Operations
UN(O)	United Nations (Organization)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
ZIF	Zentrum für internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Missions)
ZIVIK	Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung (Civil Conflict Management)

#### **UN Missions**

MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNTEAT	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

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## 6.4. Further Links

### Links to Organizations

The Israeli **Bat Shalom Center** <http://www.batshalom.org/> and the **Palestinian Jerusalem Center for Women** <http://www.j-c-w.org/> advocate a peaceful resolution to the Near East conflict. Both organizations are connected through the **Jerusalem Link**: <http://www.batshalom.org/english/jlink/>  
**Christlicher Friedensdienst – cfd**

The cfd is an aid and peace organization with a feminist point of view and mission. <http://www.cfd-ch.org/index.html>

#### **Feminist Peace**

The Feminist Peace Network is especially committed to the fight against violence towards women and children. <http://www.feministpeacenetwerk.org/>

#### **German Women's Security Council (Frauensicherheitsrat)**

A peace and security policy network formed during Germany's membership in the UN Security Council. The main goal of its work is the implementation of UN Resolution 1325. <http://www.un1325.de>

#### **Medica Mondiale**

Supports traumatized women and girls in war and conflict zones through gynecological care, psychological support, legal counsel and human rights activism. <http://www.medicamondiale.org/>

#### **NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security**

Formed in May 2000 in order to demand a UN Security Council Resolution on women, peace and security. After this was achieved with the passage UN Resolution 1325, the organization continues to work for the implementation of Resolution 1325. <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/wg.html>

#### **Northern Ireland Women's Coalition**

<http://www.niwc.org/>

#### **Owen-Frauennetzwerk**

Focused on Russian and Eastern Europe. <http://www.owen-frauennetzwerk.de/>

#### **Peacewomen**

One of the best and most comprehensive websites on the issues of women, peace and security. The Internet platform provides a far-reaching overview of the UN system, as well as of NGO's around the world working in this area. <http://www.peacewomen.org>

#### **The Bridge**

Young Israeli and Arab Women fighting together for peace in the Middle East.

<http://tx.technion.ac.il/~ada/the-bridge.html>

#### **Women for International Peace and Arbitration (WIPA)**

Provides political education on the advancement of women, peaceful conflict resolution and the role of women in peace processes. <http://www.wipa.org/>

#### **Women in Black**

View themselves not as an organization but as a forum for mobilization and action, especially through silent vigils. Formed in 1988 in Israel in protest of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. <http://balkansnet.org/wib/links.html>

**Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)**

The oldest women's peace organization. Today WILPF does lobby work for the implementation of UN

**Links to Academic Institutions and Peace Research Centers**

*Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung - AFK*

<http://www.afk-web.de>

*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung - AKUF*

<http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/index>

**Berhof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management**

<http://www.berghof-center.de>

**Bonn International Center for Conversion - BICC**

<http://www.bicc.de>

*Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik - BAKS*

<http://www.baks.com>

**Center for Conflict Studies at the Philipps-University Marburg**

<http://www.un-marburg.de/konfliktforschung/>

**Development and Peace Foundation**

<http://www.sef-bonn.org/de/index.php>

**German Council on Foreign Relations - DGAP**

<http://www.dgap.org/>

**German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - SWP*.**

<http://www.swp-berlin.org/>

**Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research - HIIK**

[http://www.hiik.de/de/index\\_d.htm](http://www.hiik.de/de/index_d.htm)

**Institute for Development and Peace - INEF**

<http://inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/>

**Institute for Peace Work and Non-Violent Settlement of Conflict - IFGK**

<http://www.ifgk.de/>

**Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg - IFSH**

<http://www.ifsh.de/>

**International Peace Research Association - IPRA**

<http://www.human.mie-u.ac.jp/~peace/index.htm>

**Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz**

[http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/SozWiss/fg-psy/ag-meth/fr\\_dt.htm](http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/SozWiss/fg-psy/ag-meth/fr_dt.htm)

**Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research at the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel - SHIP**

<http://www.schiff.uni-kiel.de/>

**Peace Research Institute Frankfurt - PRIF**

<http://www.hsfk.de>

**Swisspeace**

Action-oriented peace research institute focused on areas of conflict analysis and peacebuilding.

<http://swisspeace.org/>

## **Working Group „Gender in Security Policy and Civil Conflict Prevention“**

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- **Franziska Brantner** and **Andreas Zumach** for commenting on the European Security Strategy.

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Born in 1968. Doctoral research on urban poverty and political participation in Egypt; 1999-2001, lecturer at umdenken, Heinrich Böll Foundation in Hamburg; 2001-2001, research assistant at the University of Münster. Since October, 2002, junior professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Ruhr University Bochum. Research interests: Feminist Political Science, political participation, poverty, democratization and transformation, International Relations with a focus on feminist approaches, virtual networks. Contact: [cilja.harders@ruhr-uni-bochum.de](mailto:cilja.harders@ruhr-uni-bochum.de)

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Studied International Relations, Public Law and American Studies at the Universities of Tübingen and Minnesota. After an extended residency at the UN Mine Action Service in New York, she wrote her final project on the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty. Collaborates with the Executive Board of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation and the aid organization Oxfam, Germany. Trained as a "peace specialist" at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), election monitor for the OSCE. Member of the Executive Board of Women in International Security (WIIS), Germany and since 2001, works for Winfried Nachtwei, Green Party member of the German *Bundestag* and security expert.

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Born in 1957 in Bonn, studied Political Science, Sociology and Public Law at the Universities of Freiburg and Münster (M.A. in 1984), received her Dr. phil in 1988. Since 1989, Deputy Director of the Peace Research Information Unit Bonn (PRIUB), since 1995, Director of the PRIUB. Co-founder of the *Netzwerk Friedensforscherinnen* and the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA). 1990-1994, Executive Director of the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung e.V. (AFK)*. Since 1996, member and later Vice President (until 2000) of the Council of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), since 2004, member of the Executive Council of the IPRA. Since early 1999, member of the selection committee of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's program for the gifted.

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Born in 1968, political scientist (Diploma), has worked in the field of civil conflict management and gender for over ten years. Holds several positions in the field of development cooperation (consultant for the German Foundation for International Development - now InWent - Project Coordinator for IFOK and Director of the Civil Conflict Management Project - zivik); since 2004, works as a trainer, moderator, consultant.

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Co-founder of the newspaper, *taz*, lives in Berlin as a freelance journalist and writer, long-time involvement with the international women's movement for peace. Member of the Steering Committee of the German Women's Security Council. Latest book (2004): *"Friedenstreiberinnen - Elf Mutmachergeschichten aus einer weltweiten Bewegung,"* (Peace Promoters – Eleven Encouraging Stories from a Worldwide Movement), published by the *Psychosozial Verlag/Giessen*.

## **The Feminist Institute**

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