


# Copenhagen and Post Copenhagen Politics



**SDPI**  
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HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG  
PAKISTAN

# **Copenhagen and Post Copenhagen Politics**

Shakeel Ahmad Ramay and Fatima Rasheed

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# **Copenhagen and Post Copenhagen Politics**

Shakeel Ahmad Ramay and Fatima Rasheed

## **Introduction**

The beginning of the United Nations Climate Change Conference Of Parties (COP-15) at Copenhagen, Denmark from 7-18 December 2009 was marked with a euphoric optimism, but the Conference concluded on a note far removed from the initial goals it had set to achieve. Right from Bali 2007, climate change talks embraced a renewed fervor which peaked in 2009 before the initiation of COP-15. The world had never witnessed such high priority attention being given to climate change at the top tiers of governance. However, as the climate negotiations began to unravel, it became evident that the initial hype and hope associated with Copenhagen was misguided.

## **The Road to Copenhagen**

All major powers and forums remained engaged in discourse on climate change in one way or the other prior to Copenhagen. Major Economies Forum (MEF), Group of Eight (G-8) and Group of Twenty (G-20) held exclusive discussions on climate change, dedicating a great deal of energy and time towards reconciling the issues posed by climate change. Countries involved at these forums tried to incorporate their recommendations through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) forum, which serves as the international body responsible for coordinating a global response to climate change. However, these countries had to face staunch criticism and resistance from developing countries and international non-government organizations who felt that the “solutions” offered by the developed world left much to be desired.

Regional economic forums and organizations were on the same page with regards to the discourse on climate change. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) discussed climate at length, giving it unprecedented attention. The private sector also followed suit and devised their own set of suggestions and recommendations. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the private sector invested heavily in their efforts to advocate with government heads and policy makers to bring them on their side.

## **At Copenhagen—An Analysis**

The extensive hype surrounding climate change negotiations which was reinforced by the intensive engagement of major leaders, forums, and organizations raised the hopes of people and vulnerable groups. They came to Copenhagen expecting to get a good deal that would reflect the interests and vulnerabilities of all stakeholders. Although high hopes continued to reign, the Copenhagen negotiations while concluding a comprehensive deal was recognized as not being a realistic aim. The final document or treaty was not prepared in time for the conference as many brackets in the draft document still remained the subject of discussion, or

rather of exhaustive negotiations and bargaining, for the parties involved. Major Asia-Pacific countries had mentioned at the outset that they were not ready to sign the treaty.

Negotiations started with a great zeal. However, the negotiations were forced to confront a series of setbacks including boycotts, deadlocks and so on, which sought to severely undermine them. The small island state of Tuvalu came with a new proposal without consultation with other developing countries from its ranks. The proceedings at Copenhagen were marked with intense negotiations, exchange of strong words, changing of positions, and the emergence of new groups. The stance and conduct of major global players was rather discouraging; an analysis of the negotiations reveals the underlying politics dictating these states. These dynamics allow one to safely conclude that every country was fighting for itself rather than the fate of the planet.

The United States, before coming to negotiations announced a 17 percent decrease in emissions as compared to the 2005 level. At Copenhagen, the USA pushed every country to come up with more ambitious targets, whilst refusing to put the something binding on the table itself. Major developing economies including, China, India, Brazil and South Africa were not ready to accept any binding commitments despite the pressure mounted on them by USA and other developed countries who were trying to get them on board. These countries drew red lines for themselves and did not cross those red lines.

China came to Copenhagen after announcing a 40-45 percent decrease in per capita GDP reduction in emissions. China was expecting that the world would appreciate its move, but on the contrary she was confronted with greater pressure and a demand for binding commitments. However, China resisted every pressure and asked developed countries to reduce GHG emissions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol. Historical responsibility was the main focus of China's demand. India also joined China in this and they both negotiated together, later they were also joined by South Africa and Brazil who echoed the same objectives. Moreover, as an unprecedented turn, the G-77/China (130 developing nations) failed to maintain its integrity during Copenhagen with new groups emerging from within the ranks of the block including the African Group, Alliance Of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS), BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

### **The Copenhagen Accord—An Analysis**

The Copenhagen Accord (Annex 1) was negotiated amongst “friends’ of the chair” (Denmark) namely the USA and BASIC. As it was decided outside the panel and behind closed doors, it was not based on the consensus of all parties. Consequently, many countries were dissatisfied with its terms, with some countries going to great lengths to oppose it openly. The USA emerged as the primary winner from this Accord, followed by the BASIC bloc of countries and most vulnerable countries. Countries like Pakistan were not amongst the beneficiaries of the Accord. Countries with high carbon stock or the most vulnerable countries managed to get notable concessions, but countries like Pakistan which lie in the middle of the spectrum were left no where.

When a careful analysis of the Copenhagen Accord is undertaken, it reveals two directions: one signifies a positive movement while the other a negative one. There are certain elements in the Accord, which are very close to the demands made by vulnerable countries. At the

same time, there are also certain elements, which are more inclined towards the demands of the developed countries. Despite this, the Copenhagen Accord can be declared as a balanced accord and thus should not be discarded based on a mere superficial reading of it.

### ***Temperature Limit***

This was the first time that all developed and developing parties unanimously recognized that temperature should be kept below 2-degree Celsius in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a demand developing countries had been making for a long time. Vulnerable countries demanded an even lower target of 1.5 degree Celsius for according to them even a slight increase beyond this limit would exacerbate the vulnerabilities of certain countries. Small Island States in particular would be at the risk of extinction. Earlier unofficial statements were given to keep the temperature below 2-degree Celsius but in Copenhagen, this limit was recognized officially at the highest level among the Parties. Moreover, developed countries also agreed that they will review this target in the light of the Fifth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Pakistan officially supports limiting the temperature below 2-degree Celsius, thus from Pakistan's point of view this resolution was favorable.

However, the 2-degree Celsius temperature limit was only "recognized" by developed countries; it was neither agreed to nor accepted. What developing and vulnerable countries were expecting was a consensus, agreement or acceptance on a 2-degree Celsius limit. There is a pertinent need to understand the difference between recognition and agreement or acceptance. Simple recognition means that the issue is delegated as being important, but there is no legal binding decision undertaken regarding it. Agreement or acceptance, on the other hand, signifies not only the recognition of the problem, but goes beyond to include an agreement to cope with the problem, which is ratified by the Parties. Thus, it is important to note that at Copenhagen, there was only a formal recognition of the temperature limit, but no agreement or acceptance of it by the developed countries.

### ***Mitigation***

Mitigation was the major issue, which remained the primary topic of negotiations. United States and the developed countries were focusing on mitigation actions by other Parties, especially from major developing economies and other developing countries. This subsequently created significant and evident rifts. Major developing economies were of the view that the developed countries should first fulfill their commitments under Kyoto Protocol (KP) in line with the principal of historical emissions. Any positive and visible action taken by major developing countries in the future was conditional on the developed countries fulfilling these commitments under KP. In fact, before going to Copenhagen, certain major developing economies took some bold steps to show their commitment, for example China announced a 40-45 percent per capita GDP decrease in its emissions, while India announced shifting to more clean sources in the near future.

From the developed world, the European Union (EU) offered to cut their emissions by 20-30 percent till 2020. However, the EU made its offer conditional upon offers on similar actions taken by its developed counterparts. Since the EU failed to get a positive response from other developed countries, there were greater rifts in the bloc as some countries like Germany were already opposed to this proposal. Canada and Australia were on a completely different page.

Their efforts were focused on national development, thus, climate change was not a priority. They had not only failed to fulfill their commitments under the KP, but were also vehemently resisting efforts at creating any binding commitment.

The Copenhagen Accord (CA) agrees to reduce emissions in line with the principle and goals of sustainable development. It states that reduction levels would reflect the findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC 2007, and that emissions should be 50 percent less than 1990 levels. Principle of equity would operate thus allowing developing countries more atmospheric space for emissions. As developing countries are struggling with wide spread poverty and low living standards of people, economic growth and development is a vital and urgent need. Thus, the burden of mitigation would be relatively less on developing countries as opposed to their developed counterparts.

Moreover, developed countries parties to the KP reiterated that they are committed to reducing emissions and would provide targets for 2020 to be implemented at the domestic (and global) level to the UNFCCC by 31 January 2010. No actual targets were agreed upon the Accord text.

The position on cooperation in mitigation actions remains fairly ambiguous. There is no clearly outlined answer to what the notion of cooperation would entail. Will the developing countries be compelled to incorporate some binding commitments? Will developing countries have to compromise on their development? The answers to these questions are not catered to in the Accord creating much confusion, especially in developing countries. Several countries including Pakistan and India requested for clarification on key aspects of this section in the Accord.

### ***Adaptation***

Adaptation is an area where developing, least developed and Small Island States directed most of their efforts. Developing countries were exploring possibilities to have resources directed to them for implementation of adaptation plans and programs in their respective countries. This was an essential concern as vulnerable countries are in dire need of resources to cope with the challenge and impact of climate change, which are becoming glaringly evident in a number of countries. The Accord recognized this and developed countries agreed to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources. They also agreed to provide technology and build capacity of developing countries to implement adaptation action plans in a suitable manner. Furthermore, special consideration would be given to most vulnerable countries including Small Island States, and African countries, which are most susceptible to the threat of climate change.

Response measures were also recognized as being an important mechanism to implement adaptation plans through the intense pressure leveled by some countries. The concept of response measures can be understood as the strategic response to the drastic reduction in fossil fuel consumption that will have differing impacts on countries. Primarily, this reduction in consumption of fossil fuel will severely impact revenues of fossil fuel producing countries. Consequently, this would pose new challenges for these countries, for which they would require financial assistance. This assistance would come under adaptation actions.

Within the proposed adaptation mechanism, there remain crucial points that require further clarification by the UNFCCC. Firstly, the inclusion of fossil fuel producing countries in the eligible group has raised many concerns by other countries. Developing and least developed countries are of the view that fossil fuel producing countries are already rich in financial resources and thus do not require additional resources. The adaptation fund should be exclusively for developing and least developed countries. Secondly, there is no comprehensive definition of the most vulnerable group of Parties. How the UNFCCC will define vulnerability and rank countries in the vulnerability table still remains to be seen.

## **Finance**

Finance is a crucial area in climate change discourse and remains the major bone of contention among developed and developing countries. Developing countries are asking all developed countries to support mitigation and adaptation actions. Drawing on the principle of historic responsibility, developing countries highlight that the current build up of GHG is primarily due to the developed world. Subsequently, developing countries allege it is obligatory on the developed world to pay for mitigation and adaptation measures in their developing counterparts. As a response to these claims, developed countries have agreed to support mitigation and adaptation actions in developing and least developed countries.

The positive note in the Accord is points 8-10, which talk about short and long term climate finance (refer to Annex 1). According to the Accord, these resources will be adequate, predictable and sustainable. However, there are differences on:

1. Scale of Funding
2. Sources of Funding
3. Institutional Mechanisms

The Accord outlines that developed countries will provide US\$ 30 billion for the period 2010-2012. Moreover, they will scale up this funding to US\$ 100 billion per year by 2020. Public and private sources both will be used for this funding, though the exact share of each sector is not defined. This fund set up will be used both for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation plans in developing countries.

However, this amount is well below the need and demand of developing countries. Developing countries asked for at least US\$ 250-500 billion per year, but they were not even granted half of their demanded total. Civil society organizations had also called for a similar figure. This was put this on the table through a Fair Ambitious and Binding (FAB) deal publication, which demanded a figure of US\$ 195 billion by 2020 per year. Further breaking it down, the FAB deal listed that the adaptation fund should be around US\$ 100 billion and for mitigation it should be US\$ 95 per year. Despite the figures demanded, the developed world remained firm on the amount they put on the table. With the effect of climate change becoming increasingly evident, the world is wondering why the developed world is ignoring the pleas and plight of the populations in vulnerable countries. A failure to construct a more appropriate investment would be a crucial error. According to the Stern Report 2007, *“the costs of ignoring climate change have been estimated at more than that of the two world wars*

*and the Great Depression (5 to 20% of GDP)."*<sup>1</sup> Following an exhaustive analysis, the report concluded that if the right amount of resources were not placed on the table right now then the cost will increase many folds in the future.<sup>2</sup>

Sources of finance are another area of concern. Developing countries do not want to include the private sector as they contend that it is not a reliable source; it is profit driven and self-centered. The private sector would only make investments where they see a possibility of monetary gain. They will not support general projects on social welfare and publically owned enterprises, as these would generate little or no return on investment. On the contrary, public funding can be directed to all these activities without an expectation of any material benefit. Developed countries contend the assertion of their developing counterparts by claiming that as the private sector is very extensive and possesses a large pool of financial resources, it will bridge the gap left by public funds to provide the necessary funding. Directly responding to the apprehensions of the developing countries, developed countries highlight that the private sector can support public or community projects through Cooperate Social Responsibility funds. But, the debate continues to ensue with no formal agreement being drafted till yet.

Institutional mechanisms for financing remain one of the most controversial areas in the debate on financial resources. Developed countries are putting pressure to employ existing financial institutes for the job. They contend that the world should not waste more time in establishing new financial institutes, rather focus its efforts on empowering the existing ones. This will save time, resources and energies while also draw on the current institutes' extensive experience of managing resources.

Conversely, developing countries are not ready to accept existing institutes as a viable option. The power structure of existing institutes is biased in the favor of the developed world, especially the United States with the developing countries having virtually no share in the power structure. For example, no matter how competent a person hailing from the developing world, he cannot reach the top stratum of these institutes. Moreover, these institutes have other objects and goals to serve; thus, climate change would not be their first priority. There is a need to establish new institutes exclusively armed with this particular task, having a fairer power structure and representation. In the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries showed willingness to establish some institutions at UNFCCC, but with the condition of equal representation of all stakeholders, rather than a UN system styled representation. Developed countries also agreed to provide significant portion of resources through the Green Fund in the CA.

### ***Technology Transfer***

Copenhagen Accord does mention technology transfer from the developed world to the developing countries and capacity building of developing countries. However, it does not provide a specific road map of provision of technology. Countries agreed to establish a

- 
- 1 Department for International Development (DFID), Climate Change, Key Facts: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/How-we-fight-Poverty/Climate-and-Environment/Climate-Change/Key-facts/>
  - 2 Stern, Nicholas. (2006), "Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," United Kingdom: Rep. Office of Climate Change

Technology Mechanism, which will help and enhance development and transfer of technology to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation.<sup>3</sup>

The debate on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is yet to be finalized and the developed countries are asking for strict rules and regulations for their implementation. Conversely, developing countries want an exemption from IPRs on climate change technology so that it can be accessed and adapted by resource poor countries. It is advisable to first resolve the issue of IPRs, before establishing any facility to address technology related issues.

### **Legal Status of Copenhagen Accord**

We discussed and analyzed Copenhagen Accord above, but there is also a need to explore its status in accordance with the rules of business of the UN system. Prior to COP-15, every COP's decision was adopted unanimously. Unfortunately, COP-15 could not continue this tradition. Friends of the Chair negotiated this Accord behind closed doors and the final version was presented to the rest of the Parties. This created an atmosphere of animosity. A number of Parties rejected it outright and announced not to be associated with it. In UNFCCC negotiations, no Accord or agreement can be taken as a decision or official document until all Parties accept it unanimously. Even if a single member rejects it, it fails to take the shape of an official document.

UNFCCC did not adopt the Copenhagen Accord as a decision and just took "note" of it. According to the UN General Assembly decision 55/488 if UN "takes note of" any document then the document would be neutral. That means that the UN neither approves nor disapproves it. This document would be treated as an external document with the UNFCCC.<sup>4</sup> However, against the mandate and rules of business, the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki-moon circulated, campaigned and asked Parties to associate "register" support for the Copenhagen Accord, as well as submit targets till 31 January 2010. Later, the Danish Prime Minister also circulated a verbal note in support of the Accord.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the facts discussed above, the status of the Accord is still marred by debate. Some 56 countries met the 31 January 2010 deadline and to date the number has reached 100. All countries have submitted their targets for mitigation under Annex-1 (developed countries) and Annex-2 (developing countries). These countries contribute to about 80 percent of the total global emissions.<sup>6</sup> Negotiators of the Accord are trying to bring more people on board. If they are successful in this endeavor, it is feared that the Accord will serve as the basis for further negotiations at the COP-16 in Mexico in 2010.

3 Latif, A.A (February 2010), "Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property: A Post-Copenhagen Assessment," International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), News and Analysis, Vol. 14, No.1, Feb.2010: <http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/69167/>

4 South Centre (Jan. 2010), "Comments on the Copenhagen Accord: Summary," South Centre Informal Note 52, 18 January.

5 Ibid.

6 Bernama, Malaysian National News Agency (3 March 2010), "Climate Negotiators Eye Informal Consultations to Advance U.N. Talks," <http://www.bernama.com>

## Post Copenhagen Politics

Negotiations at Copenhagen started with great hopes, but concluded on a controversial note leaving many disillusioned. The drafting of the Accord violated UN rules of business for negotiations. This made politics more extensive after COP-15. USA, BASIC and other countries, which were part of the drafting team of the Accord began to advocate feverishly for its support. However, at the same time some countries from this group also raised questions and asked for clarifications. The Indian Prime Minister asked for some clarification particularly on mitigation plans before officially accepting it. BASIC countries met in Delhi to discuss the Accord at length before jointly associating themselves with the Accord. Now there are rumors that Indonesia is also going to join the BASIC group. Developed and developing involved in the drafting of the Accord are individually pursuing other countries to associate with the Accord so as to create a greater support base for it.

Copenhagen led to the emergence of new groups within groups. It was feared before the initiation of negotiations that the developed world would try to divide the South. This fear became a reality as the South could not hold a unanimous front and divided into new, smaller factions. BASIC countries were negotiating without any mandate from other developing and least developed countries. Following COP-15, the integrity and future of G-77/China has been thrown into question. Major developing countries deviated from the common position of G-77/China to avert pressure by gaining certain relaxations and get technology for rapid growth. Some vulnerable countries also became associated with the Accord in order to achieve short-term financial benefits.

Copenhagen also brought new powers into the limelight. China, for the most part, emerged as leading global power. China's display of muscle at the negotiations secured its national interest despite the mounting pressure from the developed world. However, later on China was much criticized in the Western media, which alleged that China had watered down the expectations from COP-15 and the subsequent Accord. China, after Copenhagen tried to bridge the gap and settle issues with other G-77/China countries, especially least developed and vulnerable countries. India also emerged as a strong power, but at the cost of the trust of G-77/China countries. For this, the government was heavily criticized domestically by its opposition and civil society.<sup>7</sup>

On 26 April 2010, the United States, in its submission to the UNFCCC claimed that future negotiations should be on the basis of the Copenhagen Accord and that there should be no negotiations on the basis of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), which had been given an extended mandate to present its findings at COP-16.<sup>8</sup>

This was feared from the beginning that many countries will take it as a new basis for negotiations, derailing the process that has been ongoing for years and has had the unanimous support of all Parties. The primary countries involved in the drafting of the Accord are

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7 *South Centre (Jan.2010)*, "Comments on the Copenhagen Accord: Summary," South Centre Informal Note 52, 18 January.

8 Third World Network (TWN) Info Service on Climate Change (4 May 2010), "US Calls for Reflection of Copenhagen Accord in New Negotiating Text," Published in SUNS #6917 dated 4 May 2010 : <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2010/climate20100501.htm>

adamant at initiating all future negotiations based exclusively on the Accord; however, they are meeting resistance from other countries that demand that the Accord not be delegated to the pedestal. Some countries that played a significant role in drafting the Accord are also hesitant to make it the primary document of negotiation while not undermining the significance of the Accord itself.

Senior Indian negotiator Prodipto Ghosh has remarked that *“The formal COP decision at Copenhagen extended the mandate of the LCA working group to enable it to present its outcome for adoption at Mexico.... The COP did agree to the LCA texts.”* While Shyam Saran, Indian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Climate Change pointed out that it needs to be discussed at a multilateral forum, otherwise the Accord will not have any relevance.<sup>9</sup>

China, Brazil and South Africa are also of the same view. Ghosh pointed out that looking at the submission by all associated members shows that there would be new battle lines when negotiations will start again in April 2010.<sup>10</sup> India in its official submission to UNFCCC clearly mentioned that the Copenhagen Accord should be taken as an input to facilitate the two track negotiations; it should not serve as the sole basis of negotiation. Years of extensive negotiations that led to unanimous decisions by all Parties should not be undermined and the process of negotiations should continue in connection with those.

Right after the Copenhagen negotiations, a negative campaign about the science of climate change started which undermined the public support for climate change. Accusing climate change scientists of data manipulation and questioning the claim of human activity being the prime cause of global warming, as well as the major claims made by leading experts on the impact of climate change on the future formed the crux of the campaign. Most of the attention and hype was directed to the debate based on a mistake made in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 2007. The Report states that glaciers in the Himalayan region are in danger and may vanish from the face of the Earth by 2035. The IPCC Board conceded to the mistake, launching extensive investigation into the matter. Skeptics, however, seized this opportunity to suggest that the threat from climate change had been greatly exaggerated and went to the extent of undermining the entire science of climate change. Some newspapers and people also demanded the resignation of Dr. Pachauri, Head of the IPCC. However at this crucial time, top officials from countries, including the US envoy came to the defense of the findings of the IPCC report and diffused the baseless doubts that sought to undermine climate science.

Negotiations are going to commence again in April 2010 in Bonn, Germany. After the deadlock at Copenhagen, it is encouraging that negotiations will be resuming. Countries are coming to the negotiations with different mindsets. Some countries are coming with broken trust following the outcome at Copenhagen, while others are hopeful that the negotiations will lead to a positive outcome. Not surprisingly, optimistic countries are primarily those who were engaged in the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord. Negotiations at Bonn would be interesting as the presence of new alliances, groups and redefined battle lines, will lead to extensive and exhaustive deliberations that would mould the future discourse on climate change.

9 Jebaraj, P. (2 March 2010), “Two Months after Climate Talks, U.S. Makes a Volte Face,” The Hindu: <http://beta.thehindu.com>.

10 Ibid.

## Pakistan's Position

Analysis of the Accord reveals that while there are some commendable points that have been incorporated, other pertinent and urgent issues have been left unresolved. Some controversial issues have only been mentioned in passing and definite resolution to these conflicts has not been reached. Despite certain shortcomings, the CA cannot be branded a complete failure and it is advisable for Pakistan to not reject it on the basis of a superficial reading.

Pakistan should question the UNFCCC regarding its position on the vulnerability table and the mechanism used to conclude it. At present Pakistan is no where; in Pakistan we talk about Pakistan's high vulnerability, but there is no analytical evidence to support this claim. Although Pakistan is highly susceptible to the threat of climate change, internationally it is not ranked within highly vulnerable groups. The presence of fossil fuel producing countries demanding a share of the adaptation fund through response measures would only work to worsen the situation for Pakistan. Now, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) has to pay extensive attention to secure its position as a highly vulnerable country through concrete evidence building.

Pakistan must consciously deliberate on and exhaustively analyze all the points of the Accord before taking a stance. It is essential that Pakistan should ask for a more fair and equitable deal at Mexico during COP-16.

A review of the Copenhagen Accord is presently underway and the GoP's mission in New York has requested clarification on the following questions:

*“What are the existing guidelines for measuring, reporting and verifying the developed countries' quantified emission reductions commitments as contained in paragraph 4 of the Accord (which relates to mitigation by developed countries)?*

*In relation to the mitigation actions by developing countries as referred to in paragraph 5 of the Accord where Parties are to indicate their actions in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, Pakistan wanted to know which developing countries are to indicate their mitigation actions. Are all developing countries who wish to associate with the Accord required to do this and does this include both unsupported and actions to be supported (by developed countries)? What would be the nature of international consultation and analysis for non-supported actions? Who will develop the guidelines for the international consultation and analysis? Would it be a domestic process?*

*Given that the measurement, reporting and verification (of the nationally appropriate mitigation actions) in accordance with the Bali Action Plan should also apply to the provision of finance and technology, what is the link between the registry for supported mitigation actions and the financial mechanism of the Convention?*

*Will the provision of funding and technology would be automatic to support and enable actions that are recorded in the registry.*

*What is meant by 'effective and efficient fund arrangements' for channeling the funding on adaptation as mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Accord?*

*Is there any existing definition of ‘most vulnerable developing country’?*

*Since the mobilization of the US\$100 billion is in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, does it imply that financing for adaptation actions during this period (2012-2020) will be in addition to the US\$100 billion?”<sup>11</sup>*

## **Conclusion**

Along with the above, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) should also seek clarification about the promised funding of US\$ 30 and US\$ 100 billion, in the short and long term respectively, for mitigation and adaptation funds. Pakistan should ask whether the adaptation funding would be independent of the mitigation funds.

The GoP displayed a positive attitude towards the Copenhagen Accord and did not reject it outright. This was because Pakistan did not want to stall the process and encouraged the continued international efforts on resolving the issue. Although Pakistan harbors serious concerns regarding the process, it still joined the consensus to take note of that document. Along with articulating its position on the Copenhagen Accord, Pakistan should continue to direct exhaustive resources to gauge the impact of climate change in the country and decipher the scope and need for adaptation and mitigation strategies.

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11 Third World Network (TWN) Info Service on Climate Change (4 Feb. 2010), “Developing Countries Express Concerns About Accord Process,” Published in SUNS #6856 dated 4 February 2010:  
<http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2010/climate20100205.htm>

## ANNEX-1

### **Copenhagen Accord<sup>12</sup>**

The Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of the following delegations present at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen:

*In pursuit* of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,

*Being guided* by the principles and provisions of the Convention,

*Noting* the results of work done by the two Ad hoc Working Groups,

*Endorsing* decision 1/CP.15 on the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action and decision 1/CMP.5 that requests the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to continue its work,

*Have agreed* on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately.

1. We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We emphasize our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2-degree Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation program including international support.

2. We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2-degree Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.

3. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by

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12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, 30 March 2010: [http://maindb.unfccc.int/library/view\\_pdf.pl?url=http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf](http://maindb.unfccc.int/library/view_pdf.pl?url=http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf)

enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries.

4. Annex I Parties commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economywide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF document. Annex I Parties that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol. Delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent.

5. Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in the context of sustainable development. Least developed countries and small island developing states may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support. Mitigation actions subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through national communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in national communications or otherwise communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix II. Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years. Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

6. We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.

7. We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing countries, especially those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway.

8. Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.

9. To this end, a High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal.

10. We decide that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund shall be established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, program, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity building, technology development and transfer.

11. In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide to establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities.

12. We call for an assessment of the implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015, including in light of the Convention's ultimate objective. This would include consideration of strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degree Celsius.