Executive Summary

The analysis in this report originates from the application of the 'State-Society Analytical Framework' (SSAF), a methodology developed by the Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster of the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP), to the Pakistani context. Structured around three main analytical dimensions, SSAF aims to identify the underlying causes of weak interaction between state institutions and citizens, and to achieve a thorough understanding of the complex power dynamics that characterise state-society relations.

The picture emerging from the exploration of how deep structures, formal and informal institutions, and the current context, shape the nature of the Pakistani state and its interaction with society, besides being very complex, is somewhat bleak.

The current state of affairs in Pakistan, characterised by a situation of extreme fragility, where resilience1 both at the state and societal levels seems reduced to minimal terms, needs to be understood in light of the complex interaction throughout history among various formal and informal factors.

To begin with, the more recent colonial history of the country has left some unmistakable marks on its formal set-up and the way people have interacted with it. The traumatic partition between India and Pakistan, and the artificial line separating Pakistan from its western neighbours, are just two of the more “visible” signs of the colonial heritage. But equally important to understanding modern-day Pakistan and its troubles in achieving a sustainable process of political development, are some less visible long-term effects of the colonial rule, such as the creation of a strong civilian bureaucracy and military class, and the establishment of semi-autonomous buffer zones along the western borders, where tribal leaders enjoyed virtually complete control of internal tribal affairs.

Those imported models of social and political organisation had to be inserted on a pre-existing structure that was still very feudal and vertically organised in nature, resulting in the strengthening of elite interests which continue to dominate the country’s political and economic life. The working logic of the social system is based on a vertical, personalised and patron-client centric approach to politics and service delivery. The need to recognise and endorse formal rules is widely accepted, also as a consequence of increasing pressure by the international community, but eventually the resulting regulations and institutions are regarded as mere facades to protect and justify the real deals happening behind them. The level of institutionalisation, in other words, may be relatively acceptable by outsiders’ standards, but it really carries little value if these formal rules are easily changed and arbitrarily enforced, as has often been the case in Pakistan’s history.

Pakistan’s society does not show, so far, the capacity to counter the existing elite alliances in control of the distribution and access to power in the country. There is an evident lack of strong horizontal networks (other than those of Pakistan’s elites) organised around shared interests and issues. Most of the hope in possible medium-term reforms is currently placed in the middle class, urban-based and educated, which until the recent global financial turmoil was growing with a steady pace. It remains to be seen, though, to what extent this new class will succeed in being an agent for change. The increased social and political consciousness of the emerging middle class is also leading to a redefinition of gender relations, often proscribed within perceived religious and societal limits, but nevertheless contributing to the increased visibility of women in the workplace, particularly in the civil bureaucracy, and of late even in the military.

In the midst of all this, the military continues to maintain a firm grip on the political, and partly, economic power of the country. Its position of vantage, built around a rhetorical mix of military-led nationalism and Islamisation of society, has been progressively strengthened through a tight control of the political processes in the country, and also through the establishment of a solid and independent economic base. The military is the dominant power broker in the country, and unless growing international and national pressure is exerted on it, it will do everything in its power to maintain its position of almost absolute control over the country’s destiny.

The irony about the Pakistani case is that, while the political executive may look considerably powerful in consideration of the few checks and balances it has to face, in terms of its capacity to formulate and implement policy, and to deliver services, it is actually quite weak. This limited capacity to operate effectively and to build the necessary legitimacy to justify its dominant position in Pakistan’s society, represents one of the biggest risks in terms of the country’s long-term stability. The legitimacy vacuum left by an elite that is completely unresponsive to the needs of the majority of the population, threatens to be filled by actors and ideologies that can mobilize masses very effectively, though not necessarily along a progressive path. The current surge of religious extremism in the country needs to be understood in this context.

Finally, the international community seems to have become increasingly aware of the concrete dangers lying ahead of Pakistan’s future developments. The risk here is that security considerations will prevail over the need to engage in a long-term process of genuine democratisation and building of substantive citizenship for most Pakistanis. The EU in particular seems to have started setting some clear priorities in terms of democratisation, governance and human rights. It remains to be seen the degree to which these intentions will be eventually achieved, given the fast diminishing operating space in Pakistan for the civilian international community.

This report aims at providing the relevant kind of context analysis for international actors to engage with Pakistan on a constructive, long-term basis, and with a view on the need to achieve genuine democratisation. It is, however, just a first step in a process that ideally should see these same international actors actively engage with the results of the analysis and reflect on their meaning with regard to the strategies that they have been implementing, or are planning to implement, in Pakistan.

Read the complete paper (PDF, 47 pages, 1,4 MB)